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ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS:
CAN FOOT-VOTING BE MADE SAFE
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ABSTRACT
According to Albert 0. Hirsebman's famous dichotomy,
citizens can express their preferences with their "Voice" (by voting
with ballots to elect better representatives) or by "exit" (by voting
with their feet to choose betterplaces to live). Suppose, however, that
ballot-voting is ineffective: Can exit not merely aid but also replace
voice? Using the People's Republic of China, a party state without
elective democracy as a case study, we argue that exit is not a
substitute for, but rather a complement to, voice. China's
bureaucratic promotion system plays the same role that local
elections do in the United States, promoting or replacing local
officials based on their performance in office. In either regime,
however, it is costly for local voters (in the United States) or the
Chinese Communist Party (in China) to monitor and assess local
officials. Attention to foot-voting in the legal design of local
government can help reduce these costs. By evaluating cadres who
run the lower levels of China'slocal governments on the basis of how
successfully they attract mobile households, the central CCP
authoritiescould reduce the costs of monitoring these local officials
and thereby reproduce,by bureaucraticmeans, some of the benefits of
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electoral democracy. The Party can most cheaply measure success in
attractingfoot-voters by evaluating cadres primarily on the basis of
local land values which, because they are a product of foot-voters'
decisions about where to live, function like ballots insofar as they
reflect the popularity of local cadres' policy decisions with mobile
Chinese households. For foot-voting to improve governmental
accountability, however, the Chinese system of local government
law
requires
some
basic
but
politically
feasible
reforms-in particular, the introduction of a local property tax
system, the creation of a federatedcity system thatgrantspower and
autonomy to sub-city units, and the liberalization of China's
household registration system to make the population fully mobile
acrossdifferentjurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION
It is a familiar idea that citizens can express their preferences
either by voting with ballots or voting with their feet. When citizens
vote with ballots, they collectively select policies or candidates
governing the jurisdiction in which they reside. When they vote with
their feet, citizens individually migrate to jurisdictions governed by
their preferred policies or officials. Using Albert 0. Hirschman's
famous dichotomy, ballot-voting is described as the use of "voice,"
while foot-voting is described as "exit."1 But the two mechanisms may
be seen as simply different ways for individuals to make collective
choices-with ballots, of people and policies; with feet, of places.
The existence of these parallel mechanisms for revealing
citizens' preferences suggests that exit might be a substitute as well
as a complement for voice. Suppose that local elections are
impractical or ineffective. Could one achieve some or all of the
accountability that such elections are intended to achieve simply by
giving citizens the power to shop around for a local government that
suits their desires? Could foot-voting not merely aid but also replace
ballot-voting?
The People's Republic of China presents an opportunity to
investigate this question of whether foot-voting can be a substitute
for ballot-voting. Although the ideology of the Chinese Communist
Party ("CCP") permits "intra-party democracy" (dangneiminzhu, V
K), actual voting on rival candidates at the local level and even
1.
See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4-7 (1970).
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within the Communist Party is strikingly rare in China.2 In general,
"cadres"-a term that, for the purposes of this article, refers to CCP
members seeking or holding public office-are assessed and promoted
by central CCP authorities without the intervention of any popular
election. The CCP's ideology of democratic centralism, in other words,
is more central than democratic, making any robust system of citizen
voice difficult to install as long as the CCP is in power.
At the same time, CCP leaders are aware of the need to
anticipate and address public complaints about air pollution,
corruption, access to jobs and education, police brutality, and other
failures of governance. 3 If there were an accurate way to measure
public demand for various local public goods that did not pose a
political risk to continued rule by the CCP, the CCP would have every
reason to embrace the mechanism. Foot-voting by mobile Chinese
citizens might be precisely such a mechanism by which (to borrow Yu
Keping's phrase) democracy might be made safe for the Communist
Party.4
We provide some cautiously optimistic arguments in favor of
exit as a way to improve the accountability of local officials to Chinese
citizens. The basic idea is that the CCP cadres who run the lower
levels of China's local governments-in particular, the urban districts
and counties rather than the provinces and prefectural-level
cities-could be evaluated based on how successfully they compete
with each other for mobile households choosing a jurisdiction in
which to live. Such success would theoretically be reflected in the

2.

For brief summaries of the debate over the seriousness of intra-party

democracy in China, see Joseph Fewsmith, Inner-PartyDemocracy:Development
and Limitations, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Winter 2010, at 4-9. For a

full-scale defense of intra-party democracy from an insider, see YU KEPING,
DEMOCRACY IS A GOOD THING: ESSAYS ON POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 3-5 (2009). For a description of various efforts to hold
township elections to decide on cadre promotions, see JOSEPH FEWSMITH, THE
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA (2012).
3.
See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY

380 (2014) (noting that the CCP is responsive to the demands of "various actors in
Chinese society, including local communities); Bruce

Gilley, Legitimacy and

InstitutionalChange: the Case of China, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 259, 264-65 (2008)
(citing studies that show how the CCP has responded to demands for more
efficient local rule); Stephen White, Economic Performance and Communist
Legitimacy, 38 WORLD POL. 462, 472 (1986) (explaining CCP electoral practices).
4.
See Yu Keping (Qiof), Zhengzhi Gaige de Heli Lujing (1 k$ ikM
M ), CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.chinainperspective.com/
ArtShow.aspx?AID= 14389.
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price of land, a price that would reflect ("capitalize") local cadres'
decisions about regulations, expenditures, and revenue-raising.
Through the magic of such capitalization, central Party officials could
evaluate which cadres were really enhancing social welfare by
satisfying their citizens' preferences for public goods instead of
wasting money on showy "face projects"5 and the pollution-generating
industry (the costs of which exceeds the benefits). In effect,
foot-voting could instigate competition among cadres for migrants to
bid up the value of their jurisdiction's land by attracting the "votes" of
foot-voters, a competition that might be a form of "intra-party
democracy" (or, at least, intra-party competition) safe enough for the
CCP to adopt.
We caution that our defense of exit is contingent on the CCP's
adoption of some system to give local cadres proper incentives and
tools for competing with each other for mobile households. At the
most general theoretical level, exit cannot be a substitute for voice
unless some mechanism gives subnational officials an incentive to
care about attracting mobile citizens. In liberal democracies, local
elections provide such a mechanism. In a Leninist system of
democratic centralism, the official criteria for bureaucratic promotion
play the role of elections. Rather than focusing on local GDP, local job
creation, or local revenue generation, central CCP authorities ought
to focus on local land prices and on promoting cadres who improve the
value of land by attracting more buyers. To facilitate citizens'
foot-voting and inter-jurisdictional competition, we urge the
introduction of a property tax system in Chinese cities-a system
which could become the monetary voice of China's mobile citizenry.
We also urge the building of a federated city system that grants
power and autonomy to sub-city units of proper size, and we
recommend the further reform of China's household registration
(hukou, FIEI) system to make the population fully mobile among
different jurisdictions.
Beyond these specific suggestions for reform in China, this
article also suggests a relationship between exit and voice in which
one is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, the other.
Without voice, or a mechanism analogous to voice like bureaucratic
promotion criteria, exit cannot function well as a system of

5.
In Chinese, "face projects" or "mianzi gongcheng" (ffi-tf) refer to
infrastructures that are showy but not useful. See, e.g., f±T-T4 F1tpl ,
,"
ift "M of
2 ±K
[How Much Could We Waste On Face Projects],
http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/byl8.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
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accountability to mobile households, because subnational officials,
angling for promotion, have no reason a priori to care about
maximizing the value of local real estate. Our specific suggested
reforms are an effort to enlist the CCP's bureaucratic promotion
system to do the work that citizen voice performs in the United States
and other liberal democracies. Whether that bureaucratic promotion
system can bear such weight is an open question. We provide only an
abstract theoretical case that foot-voting can be made safe for the
CCP if the CCP makes Chinese local governments responsive to
foot-voters.
Part I of this Article addresses the paradoxical nature of the
CCP's democratic centralism, a fundamental principle of the Chinese
party state. Part II compares foot-voting in liberal democracies and
authoritarian regimes and argues that the bureaucratic promotion
criteria in China are the necessary complement to exit-based control
of local officials just as local elections are necessary for foot-voting in
the United States. Part III proposes using land values as the main
criterion in the CCP's cadre evaluation, because they are the best
proxy for a foot-voter's choices. Part IV defends three feasible
institutional reforms, namely property tax, federated cities, and
household registration (hukou, i El) reform, to improve government
accountability through citizen mobility in China.
I.
LENIN'S NIGHTMARE: How CAN THE CENTER CONTROL
THE CADRES IN A REGIME OF "DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM"?

The benefits of exit depend on the costs of voice. If voters,
aided by a vigorous press and competitive political parties, could
easily choose officials who would truly enact those voters' preferred
policies, then the relative benefits of facilitating citizen choice
through migration would be reduced. Why rely on citizen mobility
when electoral accountability can accomplish the same end without
the hassle of migration? The answer is that sometimes there are
impediments to effective voice. Local voters, for instance, might be
rationally ignorant about political decisions because their vote has a
minuscule chance of affecting the outcome, and therefore, be
apathetic or ignorant in casting their ballots. Local governments
might also be dominated by a single political party or interest
that suppresses genuine electoral choices. Confronted by such
impediments to effective voice, one might try instead to elicit popular
preferences through exit.
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In China, citizens can use both voice and exit to control the
government, but access to both is limited by ideological and legal
constraints. Part IV discusses the institutional limits on exit. This
Part describes both the power of, and limits on, citizens' voice under
the principle of "democratic centralism." These limits on citizen voice
can be a substantial impediment to the CCP's effective monitoring
and control of its cadres, suggesting a need for voice to be
supplemented by exit.
A.

An Overview of Democratic Centralism's Limits on "Voice"

At the heart of the CCP's ideology is a contradictory attitude
towards popular participation in government, captured by the phrase
"democratic centralism" (minzhu jizhong zhi R
F4 11). Promoted
by Lenin as a principle for governing the Bolshevik Party and
eventually the Soviet state, democratic centralism has also been
adopted as a governing principle of the CCP.6 Democratic centralism
suggests a contradiction, because it simultaneously encourages and
limits popular criticism of the government.7 On one hand, the idea of
socialist democracy requires the CCP to "connect to the people
closely" by keeping a close eye on popular opinion, soliciting popular
views about the government's performance and responding to those
views in the CCP's policy decisions. On the other hand, the actual
governmental decisions must be "centralized," meaning that they
must be made by the Party leadership, not by the people themselves

6.
On the origins of democratic centralism in the Bolshevik Party, see
MICHAEL WALLER, DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM: AN HISTORICAL COMMENTARY
31-32 (1981). For Lenin's original statement of democratic centralism, see
Vladimir Lenin, Freedom to Criticise and Unity of Action, in LENIN COLLECTED
WORKS 442, 442-43 (1965), https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/
may/20c.htm; see also Vladimir Lenin, Report on the Unity Congress of
the R.S.D.L.P. (1906), http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/Russia/BOOKS/Lenin/
The%20Congress%20Summed%2OUp%201906%20%20Lenin.pdf
Lenin faced considerable internal and international opposition to his principle
of democratic centralism, with Rosa Luxemburg's 1904 article being the most
eloquent and well-known example. See Rosa Luxemburg, Organizational
Questions of the Russian Social Democracy (1904), https://www.marxists.org/
archive/luxemburg/1904/questions-rsd/. On the adoption of democratic centralism
by the CCP in 1927, see Stephen C. Angle, Decent Democratic Centralism, 33
POL. THEORY 518, 524-25 (2005) (citing ANTHONY SAICH, THE RISE TO POWER OF
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY: DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 259, 806 (1996)).
7.
For a succinct account of the tensions implicit in the idea of democratic
centralism, see Gang Lin, Leadership Transition, Intra-PartyDemocracy, and
InstitutionBuildingin China,44 ASIAN SUR. 255, 273 (2004).
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or their elected representatives. Mao's description of democratic
centralism as "contradictory parts of an integrated principle" suggests
the delicate balancing act that these two ideas require.8 The Party
listens to popular opinion in formulating policy, but it is the Party,
not majority voting by the people, that makes the ultimate decision
based on popular input.9
This idea of democratic centralism explains what to an
outside observer can seem like a perplexing contradiction. On the one
hand, public debate in China is not merely outspoken but raucous.10
On the other, any effort to engage in collective action or social
mobilization outside of the CCP is quickly and sometimes brutally
suppressed. " Consider, for instance, Chinese regulation of online
speech. With the rise of the internet and new media platforms, more
than 1.3 billion people can now broadcast their individual views.12 Far
from trying to eliminate such online discussions, the CCP has
tolerated or even actively encouraged them. 13 For example,
8.
MAO ZEDONG, On the Correct Handling of ContradictionsAmong the
People, in SELECTED READINGS FROM THE WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 432 (1971).
9.
Zhang Muliang (
t), Minzhu he Jizhong de Zhucong Guanxi shi
fK
Zenyang Xingeheng de ( IT
+ •
4
' J g
) [How Did the
Subsidiary Relationship between Democracy and Centralization Form.1,
XUEXI SHIBAO (4> RJ' ) (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.chinaelections.com/article/
196/189241.html. See also KENNETH LIBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM
REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 193 (2d. Ed. 2004) (noting that the process of
democratic centralism involves gathering input from various groups).
10.
See, e.g., Ya-Wen Lei, The Political Consequences of the Rise of the
Internet: PoliticalBeliefs and Practices of Chinese Netizens, 28 POL. COMM. 291
(2011) (finding that Chinese internet users are more politically opinionated than
traditional media users and non-media users); Li Qi & William Wan,
China s Constitution Debate Hits a Sensitive Nerve, WASH. POST (June 3,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/03/Chinasconstitution -debate -hits -a-sensitive -nerve/?utm term=.2c7ee71d25a7 (noting the
widespread discussion that took place online regarding constitutionalism in
China); Felicia Sonmez, Free Speech in China Gets an Unlikely State-Media
Backer, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/
2016/02/17/free-speech-in -china-gets -an-unlikely-state -media-backer/ (noting the
large number of comments and "likes" posted on a Chinese blog post on the
subject of internal criticism).
11.
Gary King et al., How Censorship in China Allows Government
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2013).
12.
Id.
13.
See, e.g., Ya-Wen Lei & Daniel Xiaodan Zhou, ContestingLegality in
AuthoritarianContexts: Food Safety, Rule of Law and China's Networked Public
Sphere, 49 L. & SOC'Y REV. 557, 559 (2015) (explaining how, by allowing a certain
degree of criticism, "the central government increases its information about, and
ability to monitor local Party-states").
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governmental agencies set up their own Weibo accounts to publicize
information, lead discussions, and facilitate citizen reports of cadres'
unethical behavior.14 As soon as online discussants suggest or assist
in collective action, however, they are quickly censored.15
A similar distinction seems to guide the CCP's treatment of
protests outside of cyberspace. Chinese citizens regularly and
effectively engage in "mass incidents" to protest what they regard as

14.
See, e.g., Min Jiang, Architecture of Social Management: From
E-Gov and Gov Weibo to Gov WeChat, CHINA US FOCUS (Sep. 4, 2015),
http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/architecture-of-socialmanagement-from-e-gov-and-gov-weibo-to-gov-wechat/ (describing how, after the
2011 Wenzhou high-speed train collision resulted in unprecendented public
criticism of the Chinese authorities, various government entities opened their own
Weibo accounts to bolster their presence on social media); Angela Meng,
Beijing Still Struggles to Make Voice Heard Through Sina Weibo, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Mar. 3, 2014, 4:38 AM), http://www.semp.com/news/china/
article/1438896/beijing-still-struggles -make -voice-heard-through -sina-weibo ("As
of October, there were 100,151 government Sina Weibo accounts, 66,830 of which
were department ones and 33,321 belonging to individual officials, according to a
report by the People Online Public Monitoring Office."); Min Jiang & Jesper
Schlager, How Weibo Is Changing Local Governance in China, THE DIPLOMAT
(Aug.
6,
2014),
http://thediplomat.om/2014/08/how-weibo-is-changing-localgovernance-in-china! (describing how local governments incorporated microblogs
into their administrative operation as a form of "social management," a strategy
referred to as "occupy weibo"). On the use of the internet to facilitate citizen
complaints, see the CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ("CCDI") Supervision Bureau Reporting Website:
http://www.12388.gov.cn/; see also "Wo Jubao de Wenti Chachule ma?"
Zhongiwei: Jianjian You Zhuoluo (T#
/
7 ;? "
: [Any Results on the Case I Reported?"CCD1: Everything is Being Taken Care oa,
XINHUA WANG ( 4 H), Feb. 4, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/201602/04/c 128702525.htm; Zhongiwei "Sifeng"JianduJubao PingtaiBeihou Gushi:
Meige Xansuo Dou You Zhuanren Chuzhi (PL.
E,,,
,
::
/XY
A
[The Story Behind CCDI's 'Tour Trends" Supervision and
ReportingPlatform:An Exclusive Agent Assigned to Every Lead, RENMIN WANG
( A K F ), Feb. 5, 2016, http://fanfu.people.com.en/BIG5/nl/2016/0205/6437128112734.html.
15.
See Gary King et al., Reverse-Engineering Censorship in China:
Randomized Experimentation and Participant Observation, SCI. (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://science.sciencemag.org/content345/6199/1251722; Gary King et al., supra
note 11, at 1 (using statistical analysis of the public's online commentary to show
that, "[c]ontrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic,
criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be
censored" but that "censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by
silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization,
regardless of content").
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corrupt or harmful governmental policies. 16 Consider, for instance,
the protests of thousands of Chinese residents in 2011 against the
siting of paraxylene ("PX") factories near their residences and
businesses. Riot police largely left the protestors alone, and local
officials mollified them with conciliatory speeches-suffering heckling
from the crowds for their pains. 1 While tolerating such "mass
incidents," the CCP has arrested human rights lawyers, labor
activists, and feminists who filed lawsuits or organized protests in the
name of universal human rights.1 These disparate governmental
reactions suggest a corresponding theoretical distinction. To petition
the CCP for a redress of personal grievances, even angrily, does not
offend the idea of "centralism" 7zhongzhi, t P ). To organize a
public lawsuit or demonstration to vindicate the abstract values of
human rights or feminism, by contrast, is a direct challenge to the
primacy of the CCP over public policy.
B.

How Democratic Centralism Weakens the Center

From the viewpoint of the CCP, these limits on citizens' voice
can impose substantial costs on China's governance. By excluding the
more institutionalized forms of public input such as lawsuits before

16.
See, e.g., Kevin J. O'Brien, Rightful Resistance, 49 WORLD POLITICS 31
(1996) (describing how citizens in China use "rightful resistance" to challenge
cadre malfeasance); Tong Yanqi & Lei, Large-Scale Mass Incidents and
Government Responses in China, 1 INT'L J. CHINA STUD. 487 (2010) (describing
how social protests in China became increasingly common starting in the 1970s
and the broad range of issues that can drive protests, including tax concerns, land

and labor disputes, environmental issues, and ethnic unrest).
17.
See Jonathan Watts,
Tens of Thousands Protest Against
Chemical Plant in Northern China, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2011),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/14/china-protest-against-pxchemical-plant.
18.
See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting Rights Lawyers
in a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rights-lawyers.html? r=0; Sui-Lee Wee,

China Arrests Four Labor Activists Amid Crackdown: Lawyers, REUTERS
(Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-idUSKCNOUO05M

20160110; Andrew Jacobs, Taking Feminist Battle to China's Streets, and
Landing in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
04/06/world/asia/chinese -womens -rights -activists -fall-afoul-of-officials.html;
Didi

Kirsten Tatlow, In China, Relatives Await Word on Detained Rights Lawyers
Afier a Year, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/
world/asia/china-human-rights-lawyers.html.
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independent courts, op-eds from an independent press, or competitive
elections of representatives, the "centralizing" side of democratic
centralism weakens the constraints on the CCP's cadres, allowing
them secretly to defy CCP policies, because neither the CCP
leadership nor the disorganized and extra-institutional public is
capable of monitoring officials in China's tens of thousands of
subprovincial governments.19 In this respect, democratic centralism
faces a paradoxical dilemma: The more the CCP excludes private
citizens from a formal and institutionalized role in controlling local
cadres in the name of centralism, the more the local cadres will take
the law unto themselves, secretly defying the leadership and thereby
undermining the very centralism that the CCP sought to advance
through its tight control of public debate.20
The CCP's need for assistance in monitoring its local agents is
not unique to China. It is a familiar problem of agency costs that
afflicts all large organizations, including congressional supervision of
the bureaucracy in the United States. The problem arises from the
informational advantages enjoyed by the bureaucracy that
implements the central government's general programs. The
bureaucracy will typically know much more about the real costs and
benefits of the 21programs it implements, precisely because it
implements them.

19.
China has 41,636 township-level governments, 2,862 county-level units,
333 prefecture -level units, and 31 provincial-level units (data from 2006).
Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and
Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1084 (2011).
20.
For rich descriptions of this dilemma relating successful cadre
evaluation to rule of law, see Murray Scot Tanner & Eric Green, Principalsand
Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control Over Policingand Obstacles to "Rule
of Law"in China, 191 CHINA Q. 644 (2007); Carl F. Minzer, Riots and Cover-ups:
Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in China, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 53
(2009).

21.
For classic accounts of the costs faced by Congress in monitoring the
bureaucracy in the United States, see, for example, LAWRENCE C. DODD &
RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 170-73 (1979)
(describing the "dispersed and haphazard nature of [Congressional] oversight" of
exectutive agencies); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 388 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (discussing how
regulatory agencies internal operations are largely independent from executive or
legistlative scrutiny or control because what the agencies do "has little or no
political significance"). For a discussion of oversight in different political systems,
see SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 57

(1993). As in the United States, informational obstacles to oversight in China can
take the form of goal displacement (local bureaucracy implementing the "letter"
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The challenge of supervising local officials poses a dilemma
for the CCP's central authorities in which simplicity of evaluation
criteria competes with such criteria's completeness. Too little
information leads to administrative simplicity, but also to promotions
unrelated to cadre success in promoting citizen welfare. Too much
information, however, creates opportunities for factions to
manipulate the evaluation criteria to favor their own members.
Consider, first, the lemma of over-simplified criteria. The
CCP's reliance on GDP growth as the major criterion for evaluating
local leaders provides an example of the costs of clear but crude
markers of cadre success.22 GDP growth is easy to measure and
clearly visible to supervising officials, but it is also unrelated to social
costs that do not affect economic productivity, including social and
environmental costs like traffic jams, air pollution, loss of historic
buildings, and destruction of socially cohesive neighborhoods.23 The
perverse incentives created by promoting cadres on the basis of local
GDP is illustrated by the problem of so-called "ghost cities"-often
enormous real estate developments promoted by local government
officials but inhabited by virtually no residents. The famous ghost
city, Ordos, in inner Mongolia, presents a classic case.24 One party
but not the "spirit" of the central policy) or data falsification. See Alex Wang, The
Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in
China, 37 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 365, 412 (2013).
22.
GDP has indeed been the primary criteria for cadre promotion since the
1990s. The unspoken rule is that if one does well with respect to the economy, one
has the prospect of becoming a central ministry official or joining the Politburo.
See Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law
and Bureaucracyin China, 37 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 365, 388 (2013) (quoting a
central government official in stating that "[e]veryone sees this and knows the
deal [that GDP is key]").
23.
For a similar suggestion, see Grossly Deceptive Plans,THE ECONOMIST
(Jan.30, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21689628-chinas-obsessiongdp -targets -threatens-its -economy-grossly-deceptive -plans. On the invisibility of
environmental measures in a GDP-centered system, see Wang, supra note 21, at
388 (quoting a central government official in stating that "[i]n the past, if you
spent a lot of money and effort on a wastewater treatment plant, the center would
not see it ("+tc/Yji, (zhongyangkan bujian)").
24.
Jody Rosen, The Colossal Strangeness of China's Most Excellent
Tourist City, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/tmagazine/
ordos -china-tourist-city.html. For a stark photo portrait of Ordos, see Michael
Christopher Brown, Ordos, China: A Modern Ghost Town, TIME MAGAZINE,
http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1975397,00.html. For a less
negative assessment, see Eli Bildner, Ordos: A Ghost Town That Isn't, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/ordos-
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secretary expanded the city boundary and built numerous roads to
the otherwise empty Kangbashi section of the jurisdiction and was
later promoted to the provincial-level inner Mongolia government.25
He was succeeded by a second party secretary who built a substantial
number of skyscrapers and was also promoted. 26 A couple of years
after the development had been completed, it stood empty, and the
third party secretary was stuck with the ghost city, to which no
residents wanted to move. 27 In short, perverse promotion criteria
seems to have induced the local Party leadership to inflate a
temporary real estate bubble, creating construction jobs and GDP
figures that they could tout as a basis for their promotion, passing on
a real estate bomb to their hapless successor.
The problem of over-simplified and incomplete promotion
criteria is not unique to the focus on GDP: Any "hard" numerical
target will tend to squeeze out consideration of vaguer, less easily
measurable criteria. 28 As a response to the "hard" target of energy
usage reduction in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, for instance, local
governments across the country deliberately imposed power outages,
denying electricity even to hospitals, schools, traffic lights, and
homes.29 These outages also prompted private enterprises to use
small-scale diesel fuel generators that defeated the pollution-reducing
purpose of the hard target.30
Switching to the other lemma of more complex and
contradictory evaluation criteria, however, does not solve the problem
of information costs. The 2009 Experimental Regulation of the CCP
Central Organization Department on the Evaluation of Local Leaders
and Cadres contains many contradictory goals that merely

a-ghost-town-that-isnt/274776/ (interviewing filmmaker about Ordos documentary
showing "how optimistic people are there, and how hopeful they are").
25.
Conversation with a Chinese economist who consulted with the Ordos
government and whose name needs to be kept anonymous (Nov. 19, 2014).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
See, e.g, Kevin J. O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, Selective Policy
Implementation in Rural China, 31 COMP. POLITICS, 167, 173-74 (1999) (because

of the difficulty in formulating measurable targets and lack of grass-root
participation, local cadres have selectively implemented unpopular policies such
as collecting taxes and enforcing birth control over nonquantifiable goals such as
employing a democratic work style and respecting villagers' rights).
29.

See Wang, supra note 21, at 421-22.

30.

Id.
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replace the problem of incompleteness with opacity? Contradictory
criteria-say, environmental quality and job growth in polluting
industries-are so indeterminate as to be uninformative, inviting
each faction in the leadership to promote political allies rather than
the truly more successful or qualified cadres.32 The identity of the
evaluator's faction and the loyalty of the evaluated cadres to their
patron can then
often play a more important role than actual cadre
33
performance.
Democratic centralism reduces the capacity of the CCP to
overcome this dilemma of information costs by reducing citizens'
effective monitoring of local officials. 3 Local residents have an
immediate self-interest in efficient infrastructure, cleaner air, honest
government, and other local public goods. Their organized,
institutional resistance to local cadres could act as "fire alarms," in
McCubbins' and Schwartz's familiar phrase, allowing central
authorities to economize on their monitoring efforts by focusing on
those local jurisdictions where there is a higher risk that local cadres
are under-performing. 3' The CCP recognizes the advantages of

31.

Zhongzubu Yinfa Shishi Difang Lingdaobanzihe Ganbu Kaohe Shixing
i) 7
JJ 7 , U
&Y A >( 77,) [The CCP Organization
Department PromulgatesImplementation Regulations on the Evaluation of Local
Leaders and Cadres], RENMIN WANG (AN F
[A)(July 7, 2006), http://polities.
people.com.en/GB/1027/4567774.html. The 2009 regulation evaluated cadres
based on their success in promoting scientific development, including not only
GDP but also education, health care, social safety, cultural activities; and
sustainable development, carbon emission reduction, environmental protection;
and improvement of living standards, and living environment, transportation.
32.
See Charles N. Halaby, BureaucraticPromotion Criteria, 23 ADMIN.
Sci. Q. 466, 468 (1978) (discretionary criteria place the control of career
opportunities in the hands of administrative officials).
33.
Victor Shih et al., Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining
the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 166 (2012). For argument and data suggesting that patronage plays a more
ambiguous role in cadres' careers, see Jinghan Zeng, What Matters Most in
Selecting Top Chinese Leaders? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,
18 J. CHIN. POL. SCI. 223 (2013), https://www.researchgate.net/file.PostFile
Bana (

Loader.html?id=56b018c05e9d9700a48b4575&assetKey=AS%3A32451259423539
2%401454381239176.
34.
See Huang Yanzhong, The State of China's State Apparatus, 28 ASIAN
PERSPECTIVE 31, 47 (2004) (lower-level officials can fool higher authorities more

easily than their counterparts in liberal democracies because of the lack of
oversight from citizens).
35.
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, CongressionalOversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 171-76
(1984).
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citizens' assistance in governance, making use of devices like
"democratic appraisal meetings" (minzhu pingyi, tt$) in which
lower-level cadres anonymously evaluate their superiors as a
complement to the usual top-down evaluations. 36 Democratic
centralism, however, weakens these popular controls by limiting the
degree to which citizens can organize institutions for independent
collective action. Providing unstructured venues for individual citizen
complaints-for instance, "appraisal meetings," websites through
which lone individuals can report local corruption, or a bureau of
letters of complaints 37 (guojia xinfang ju, MI * Po D) N )-is no
substitute for private organizations like newspapers, unions, and
organized interest groups. Such civil-society organizations can
shoulder the costs of acquiring legal, accounting, and economic
expertise and overcome "free rider" problems of public action that
38
isolated individuals cannot or will not bear.
Therefore, the CCP's suspicion of such an institutionalized,
collective role for private citizens in the name of democratic
centralism is actually decentralizing, not centralizing, because such
suspicion empowers local cadres at the expense of the central CCP. In
this sense, democratic centralism is self-defeating if it excludes all
institutionalized and organized input from the public, demanding
citizen passivity or merely individual complaints and petitions rather
than active collective engagement.

II. THE LIMITS AND PROMISE OF FOOT-VOTING IN LIBERAL
DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
If citizen voice is muted by democratic centralism, why not
rely on citizen exit? Both voice and exit, after all, are means by which
36.
See Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control: CCP Cadre
Management from a Township Perspective, 173 CHINA Q. 35, 42-43 (2004)
(evaluating the cadre management system and arguing that the Chinese
party-state has the capacity to be selectively effective in implementing its priority
policies).
37.
On the Chinese tradition of "letters and calls" by which individual
citizens can petition for redress of grievances, see Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang An
Alternative to FormalChinese Legal Institutions,42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 176-77

(2006).

38.

For the classic account of the costs of collective action, see, for example,

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

(1965). For an

account

of how

private interest groups overcome such collective action problems, see, for example,
LAWRENCE ROTHENBERG, LINKING CITIZENS TO GOVERNMENT: INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS AT COMMON CAUSE (1992).
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citizens can select the local officials who govern them. Could
foot-voting, therefore, make up for the limits on ballot-voting in
China?
As we explain below in Part II(A), exit cannot be a substitute
for voice, but it can be a supplement. It is a fallacy to assume that
local officials somehow naturally seek to enlarge their tax revenue or
any other resources that such migration might produce.39 As such, the
"market" for local governments cannot arise unless some specific
mechanism exists to make local officials care about attracting
foot-voters. Incentives to care about foot-voters ordinarily take the
form of some sort of "voice"-that is, some mechanism by which local
officials' superiors (either local voters or bureaucratic superiors)
express an opinion about the performance of local officials by voting
on those officials' promotion, demotion, or dismissal. In this sense, the
efficacy of exit is always dependent on the efficacy of voice that
commands local officials to care about whether their communities are
attractive to migrants.
The absence of local elections does not mean that Chinese
local officials can never have incentives to cater to foot-voters. We
suggest that China's criteria for bureaucratic promotion can be
enlisted to induce local cadres to care about households' foot-voting
just as local elections are used in the United States to force politicians
to campaign on boosting home values. Our argument hinges on an
analogy between what William Fischel has called "homevoters"-that
is, the property-owning electorate of a local government in the United
States-and
the CCP's
bureaucratic
evaluators
of cadre
performance. 4' As explained in Part II(B)(1) below, homevoters in
liberal democracies vote against locally-elected officials who do not
enact policies attractive to them, thereby inducing local politicians to
care about making their jurisdiction attractive to such homebuyers.
We explain in Part II(B)(2) that, in China's system of democratic
centralism, the central authorities can play the role of homevoters by
withholding promotion from local cadres who fail to make their

39.
On the dangers of analogies between public and private organizations
that ignore their differing incentives, see Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government
Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 345, 345 (2000) ("[G]overnment does not internalize costs in the same way as
a private firm").
40.
WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES 1-16 (2001) [hereinaftrer FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS].
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jurisdiction attractive to Chinese households, thereby giving cadres
an analogous incentive to care about attracting homebuyers.
We will defer until Part III our exposition and defense of a
cadre evaluation system rooted in the value of local land-the
criterion that we take to be the most faithful measure of success in
attracting foot-voters. In this section we make the more basic case
that citizen exit can help fix shortcomings of citizen voice only if the
authoritarian analogue to local elections-bureaucratic promotion-is
revised to make exit relevant to local leaders.
A.

The Fallacy of Simple Analogies Between Private Markets
and Local Governments

At least since the work of Charles Tiebout was introduced
into the legal academy in the late 1970s, it has become commonplace
for legal scholarship to analogize local governments to private firms
that market public goods to "consumer-voters."41 Under this view,
foot-voting citizens shop among local governmental "firms" looking for
the best mix of price and quality in governmental services.4 2 Local
officials cater to these mobile "consumer-voters" because those
officials want to maximize the value of local real estate.43
ignores
to care
owners
value

This firm-government analogy is incomplete, because it
the need for a feedback mechanism that induces local officials
about attracting foot-voters. After all, those officials are not
of the real estate who are entitled to appropriate the gains in
from attracting buyers. Moreover, powerful ideological

41.
Charles Tiebout's seminal article, The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditures, did not have much impact on economic scholarship until Wallace

Oates demonstrated that Tiebout's theoretical mechanism of citizen mobility had
the practical effect of causing the price of land to reflect the quality and tax price
of local public goods. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofPublicExpenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956); Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of PropertyTaxes andLocal
Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization
and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957, 968 (1969). It took another
decade for Tiebout's ideas to penetrate legal scholarship. For a brief history of
Tiebout's influence in legal scholarship, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Compared to
What? Tiebout and the Comparative Merits of Congress and the States in
ConstitutionalFederalism, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 239-53 (William A. Fischel ed.,

Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol'y 2006). For a survey of Tiebout's influence on
economists, see Wallace Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE
TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY, supra, at 24-42.

42.
43.

Tiebout, supra note 41, at 418-20.
Id. at 419-20.
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constraints in both liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes
like the CCP's China prevent such officials from simply being
transformed into real estate developers with rights to appropriate
such gains in real estate values for personal use. Absent such
personal incentives, however, why should one assume that local
officials will care about attracting foot-voters? Foot-voters would be
effectively "voting" for officials who did not care about winning the
"election." For such migrants, exiting one badly governed jurisdiction
in favor of another would be a trip from the frying pan into the fire:
Indifferent to whether their communities grew or shrunk, officials
would have no reason to be honest or competent as a way to attract
migrants.
The fallacy of arguing that citizen mobility can be a substitute
for defective voice is illustrated by Professor Ilya Somin's argument
that citizen mobility can be a cure for voter ignorance.45 Professor
Somin reasons that, because citizens who vote with their feet reap all
of the gains from their migration, they avoid the well-known
incentives for rational ignorance about politics that afflict
ballot-voting. 46 The difficulty with Professor Somin's theory is that, in
denigrating citizens' capacity for intelligent exercise of the franchise,
he has also undercut the incentives for local officials to care about
attracting migrants. Even if there is high demand among such
migrants for honest and competent governance, why would any
politician care about meeting this demand? By Professor Somin's own
hypothesis, voters are rationally ignorant about those politicians'
success in boosting local property values.47 If the local governments
do not care about the migrants, then why should the migrants invest

44.
In general, the idea that a public official is a fiduciary of the public bars
officials from profiting personally from the performance of their official duties.
See generallyANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE
88-95 (2003) (discussing a fiduciary understanding of public office). Accordingly,
in both the United States and China, public officials' personal financial gain from

an official decision affecting the value of their personal wealth is ordinarily
regarded as a conflict of interest requiring the disclosure of the conflict, the
recusal of the official, or the reversal of the decision. See generally PATRICIA E.
SALKIN, 4 AM. L. ZONING 38.10 (5th ed. 2016); Ting Gong & Jianming Ren, Hard
Rules and Soft Constraints: Regulating Conflict of Interest in China, 22 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA 1, 12-14 (2013) (discussing the types of disclosures of conflicts of
interest officials are required to make).
45.
ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 119-20 (2d ed. 2013).
46.
Id. at 120-25.
47.
Id. at 141.
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much effort in comparison shopping among the local governments?
Professor Somin assumes that local governments compete with each
other for migrants, because "[s]tates and localities seek to attract new
residents and businesses as sources of tax revenue," but his argument
that voters are irredeemably ignorant about politics undercuts this
assertion about subnational politicians' incentives.4 If voters do not
pay attention to politics, then why should canny politicians care
about gaining tax revenue? As Albert Hirschman noted, local officials
governing a passive population might actually want to deter
immigration of more demanding citizens into their city.49 If ease of
exit rids an organization of pesky "squeaky wheels" while leaving the
more quiescent members in place, then the organization managers
will encourage exit and provide low-quality services to the passive
citizenry who are left behind.50 The electoral incentive, therefore,
might actually create incentives for local officials to reduce the
attractiveness of their communities and thereby drive away potential
51
political opponents, such as members of a different ethnic group.
Professor Somin's theory of local governments' competing for
a mobile populace, in short, depends on a theory of informed local
voters that the rest of his book rejects. In this respect, Professor
Somin's theory of exit is similar to more formal economic models that
simply assumed away the problem of a feedback mechanism through
which local officials would have incentives to attract the optimal
number of migrants. Charles Tiebout's landmark article, A Pure
Theory of Local Public Expenditures,52 for instance, explicitly rested
on the assumption that the local managers sought to maximize the
value of local real estate by maintaining the community at its optimal

48.

Id. at 145.

49.
See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 124 (1970) ("[M]anagement will,"

Hirschman argued, "therefore strain to strip the members -customers of the
weapons which they can wield, be they exit or voice, and to convert, as it were,
what should be a feedback into a safety valve.").
50.
Consider, as an example of such an argument, the common complaint
that "school choice" undermines public schools' quality by making it easy for the
most vocal parents to leave, depriving the parents who stay behind of political
clout and sophistication. See generallyJames S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101
YALE L.J. 259 (1991).
51.
Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, The Curley Effect: The
Economics of Shapingthe Electorate,21 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2005).
52.
Tiebout, supra note 41.
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size "to lower average costs" of providing local goods. 53 Economists
building on Tiebout's model maintained this assumption without
defending it, essentially assuming that mayors were ipso facto
entrepreneurial real estate developers seeking to get the highest
return on land sales.54 But local officials are emphatically not real
estate developers. Unless they are corrupt, they derive no automatic
benefit from appreciating land prices, and, as noted above, they might
very well be disadvantaged by the arrival of nosy, vocal homebuyers
into their jurisdiction. Why, then, should local officials try to make
their jurisdictions appealing to these foot-voting migrants?
B.

Feedback and Foot-Voting: Electoral Voice and Bureaucratic
Promotion as Necessary Complements to Exit-Based Control
of Local Officials

Theories of exit, in short, require some mechanism aside from
the threat of exit itself to motivate local officials. As we explain below,
in liberal democracies, that mechanism is the ballot: Local officials
care about maximizing local property values because local voters
punish these officials when home prices go down. In authoritarian
regimes, the necessary mechanism is bureaucratic promotion by CCP
superiors. What reason is there to believe that either voters or CCP
superiors are either willing or able to enforce their criteria for
promotion and demotion against local officials?
1. The Homevoter Hypothesis as Feedback Mechanism
Linking Ballot-Voters and Foot-Voters
Consider, as an example of such an amalgamation of exit and
voice in liberal democracy, William Fischel's influential "homevoters
hypothesis," in which local voters' inability to exit forces them to
participate effectively and intelligently in politics. 55 "Homevoters," in
Fischel's lexicon, are simply local residents who are held hostage to
their local government's decisions affecting local real estate's value
53.
Id. at 419 ("The last assumption is that communities below the
optimum size seek to attract new residents to lower average costs. Those above
optimum size do just the opposite. Those at an optimum try to keep their
populations constant.").
54.
See, e.g., Jon C. Sonstelie & Paul R. Portney, Profit Maximizing
Communities and the Theory of Local Public Expenditure, 5 J. URB. ECON. 263
(1978) (arguing that "if communities act as if they are profit maximizing firms,
resources will be efficiently allocated to the provision of local public goods.").
55.

FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supranote 40.
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because they purchased that real estate before the decisions were
made.56 Because potential homebuyers will take into account the
predicted effect of those decisions when making their bid, homevoters
cannot escape the value-lowering decisions of incumbent politicians
by selling their land. 57 Homevoters must stand and fight-and they
fight hard, overcoming the ignorance about politics that normally
affects their ballots, because a huge and uninsurable portion of their
assets are tied up in their land investment, making such ignorance
less rational. 58 Because homebuyers pay more for low taxes,
value-enhancing zoning regulations, and high-quality (mostly
educational) services, the value of the political decisions creating such
conditions will be "capitalized" into the value of the homes that
homevoters have purchased, giving every homevoter an incentive to
show up at planning commission hearings and city council meetings
even if they do not have kids in school. 59 Under Fischel's model, in
other words, local politics ("voice") depends on a combination of
homebuyers' freedom of movement ("exit") and homevoters' lack of
exit. The former gives local voters information about how local
decisions affect net welfare. The latter gives local voters incentive to
pay attention to this information.
2. Cadre Promotion Criteria as the Feedback Mechanism
Linking the CCP and Foot-Voters:
The Case of "Market-Preserving Federalism"
What
analogous
mechanism
provides
feedback
in
authoritarian systems, where local officials are not responsible to
local homevoters through elections? One mechanism is bureaucratic
promotion criteria. To the extent that an official's chance of promotion
is enhanced by the official's attracting migrants to his or her
jurisdiction, that official will have incentives to cater to foot voters
just as much as if the migrants actually enjoyed the ballot, because
the foot-voting migrants would hold the fate of the official in their
collective hands. In effect, the central CCP authorities would play the
role of homevoters in Fischel's system, judging the performance of
local cadres by their proficiency in attracting homebuyers.
Would local cadres really cater to foot-voting households if the
criteria for promotion in China's cadre evaluation system (ganbu
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.at 4-6.
Id. at 59-61.
See id at 39-72.
Id. at 8-10,29-31.
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kaohe zhidu, "N 44$$ r) were more closely tailored to cadres'
proficiency in attracting homebuyers? Just as local voters might be
indifferent to local elections, CCP superiors in Beijing might also be
indifferent to official promotion criteria, relying instead on personal
ties and factional loyalties between local officials and CCP leaders.60
On the other hand, it is also possible that central authorities might
care about official promotion criteria at the middle levels of
subnational government-such as prefecture-level cities, urban
districts, and counties-because there the familial connections to the
highest CCP elites in Beijing are rare, but the positions are also too
removed from the highly localistic kinship networks that control
subcounty politics.61
Both anecdotal and more systematic evidence suggests that,
at least for those mid-level subnational posts, the official promotion
criteria matter: When those criteria require local cadres to compete
with each other to appeal to private actors such as private investors
or tourists, cadres aggressively conform to those criteria.62 Consider,
for instance, the idea that the Chinese system of subnational
government is "market-preserving" in that it is responsive to the
demands of mobile capital. Most famously defended by Montinola,
Qian, and Weingast in the mid-1990s, 63 the "market-preserving"
theory of federalism is rooted in the hypothesis that subnational
officials will abstain from predatory expropriation of investment
capital if they are evaluated on the basis of their jurisdiction's
GDP and revenue. 64 Official promotion criteria have historically
emphasized a local government's GDP and revenue generation,65 and

60.

See Victor Shih et al., supra note 33, at 167.

61.
For a study of subcounty official positions dominated by local elites, see
Feng Junqi (5-t),
Zhongxian Ganbu (V%
) [Party Cadres in Central
County] (June 2010) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Peking University).

62.
For a humorous example of such competition, consider the reality TV
show "Sights of Shanxi," in which Chinese mayors are evaluated before a studio
audience by their superiors on their capacity to attract tourists to their cities.
The mayors vie with each other to sell their cities, making often colorful pitches
and earning tough public criticism from a panel of judges when their pitches
are rejected. See You're stir-fried squid, ECONOMIST (June 18, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21700687-youre-fired-chinese-officials-meet
-apprentice -youre-stir-fried -squid.

63.
See Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political
Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50 (1995).
64.
Id. at 70.
65.
See PIERRE F. LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA:
THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S CONTROL OF LOCAL ELITES IN THE POST-MAO ERA
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the link between both of these criteria and private investment in land
is plain enough. Moreover, the evidence suggests that Chinese local
officials seeking promotion aggressively protect the interests of the
owners of mobile capital just as they are instructed to do by the
official criteria favoring economic growth. 6
GDP and revenue, as noted above, are only imperfectly
related to the welfare of Chinese households. The responsiveness of
local cadres to foot-voting by owners of investment capital, however,
suggests that, just as competition for promotion induces cadres to
cater to the needs of investment capital, so too cadres might be
induced to promote Chinese households' interests if households'
foot-voting was made a central criterion for bureaucratic promotion.
As we explain below in Part III, one way to align cadres' incentives
with the foot-voting choices of households is to base bureaucratic
promotion on the value of land within a local cadre's jurisdiction.
III. USING LAND VALUES AS THE BEST PROXY
FOR HOUSEHOLDS' FOOT-VOTING
How can bureaucratic promotion criteria best be aligned with
the choices of China's foot-voting households? We suggest that the
link is best expressed by a simple, single number: The change in a
local government's aggregate land prices over the period for which a
local cadre is being evaluated. Land prices that rise suggest that the
local government is attracting mobile households, while falling land
prices suggest that foot-voting households are choosing other
jurisdictions. In liberal democracies, "home voters"-meaning
residents who elect local officials-use this price signal as a guide for
re-electing or throwing out incumbent officials. In authoritarian
regimes, the ruling regime's bureaucratic evaluators of local officials
can likewise use land values as a yardstick by which to measure
official performance. In response, local officials will plausibly respond
by trying to boost land values, just as they tried to boost the number

(2008) (observing that economic growth has been the major evaluation criterion in
the handbook of the CCP Central Personnel Department (

66.

)

For a survey of evidence that local officials compete for investment to

obtain promotions, see Chenggang Xu, The FundamentalInstitutions of China's
Reform and Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1079 (2011),
http://www.sef.hku.hk/-cgxu/04 Xu.pdf. For evidence that success in winning
revenue actually earns promotions for county-level officials, see Hongbin Li &

Li-An Zhou, PoliticalTurnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of
Personnel Controlin China, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1743 (2005).
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of GDP, which has been the main criteria of cadre evaluation and
promotion in the past two decades. We argue that this incentive will
generally induce such officials to make their jurisdictions attractive
to home buyers-in effect, campaigning for re-election before a
constituency of foot-voters.
A.

The Basic Defense of Land Values as the Best Proxy
for Foot-Voters' Choices

Why should land prices, rather than a jurisdiction's net
population gain or loss, constitute the best measure of a local
government's ability to attract foot-voters? The reason is that land
prices provide more information about citizens' preferences. As early
as 1979, Arnott and Stiglitz noted that "the practice of inferring
individual valuations of public goods from land values is now
widespread. 67 As Anup Malani has noted, the amount by which a bid
on a house in one jurisdiction exceeds bids on identical houses in
other jurisdictions is a measure of how much more the bidder values
the more expensive jurisdiction. 68 Such relative desirability is
influenced by local officials' decisions about education, traffic
regulation, crime control, and overall governmental efficiency, which
are reflected-in economic jargon, "capitalized"-in real estate
prices.6 9 If land prices in one jurisdiction are much higher than land
in neighboring and otherwise identical jurisdictions, then this
difference is an indication that the former jurisdiction's land is much
better governed than the latter jurisdiction's.0 If one is interested in
the intensity as well as the direction of citizens' preferences, then
higher land prices are superior to demographic growth as an

67.
See Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Aggregate Land Rents,
Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal City Size, 93 Q. J. ECON. 471, 471
(1979).
68.
This point is ably defended by Anup Malani. See Anup Malani, Valuing
Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2008). In general, our
argument in this section is consistent with and relies upon Malani's argument.
69.
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 40, at 39-72 (explaining
capitalization).
70.
Id.; see also, Vicki Been, "Exit"as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
514-529 (1991) (discussing capitalization; studies indicate that consumers
consider a community's public service and tax packages when deciding which
jurisdiction to live in).
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indication of what and how much foot-voters value the amenities
7 1
offered by a local government.
Land prices shaped by citizens' foot-voting help solve the
dilemma of democratic centralism outlined in Part I above-the
dilemma of administratively simple yet substantively complete
promotion criteria. The CCP wants to take into account all aspects of
cadre performance that affect citizen welfare, but the CCP also needs
to have criteria that yield some definite result when rival local
officials compete for a promotion. How, then, to rank cadres who score
differently on different criteria? How does one decide to award a
promotion in a contest between the most frugal mayor, the mayor
with the environmentally cleanest city, the mayor with the highest
employment, and the mayor with the best educated children? Each
out-performed the others in some respect but not in others: The CCP
needs a simple bottom-line factor that will aggregate each of these
values in a way reflective of citizen preferences. Because homebuyers
take into account every aspect of a jurisdiction's quality when making
a bid, land prices should "capitalize" otherwise incommensurable
aspects of governmental performance into a single number. 2 Unlike
numerical weights that the CCP assigns to different aspects of cadre
performance, land prices are not arbitrary decisions by the CCP, but
instead reflect the collective ranking of these aspects by millions of
foot-voting citizens. Land prices, therefore, put the "democratic" back
into "democratic centralism," allowing the CCP to infer what citizens
really value from what they are willing to pay. 3
Instead of land prices informed by citizens' foot-voting, one
might attempt to rely on survey instruments to rank cadres on their
effectiveness in satisfying their constituents, as suggested by Li and
Liang. 7' But such direct measurement of satisfaction imposes
enormous information costs on cadres' supervisors. As Li and Liang
acknowledge, "[c]ompared with economic growth, inhabitants'

71.
The defense of land prices over simple demographic change is
analogous to the defense of the single transferable vote over first-past-the-post
plurality elections.
72.
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 40, at 5-6 (noting that
homeowners think holistically about local government).
73.
See Malani, supra note 68, at 1309-11.
74.
See Shujuan Li & Yan Liang, Competition Model and the Change of
Local Governments'Behaviorand Governance of China'sLocal Government Debt,
49 CHINESE ECON. 199 (2016) (providing such an argument for tournaments
between local officials who are assessed by the relative satisfaction of the citizens
that they govern).
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satisfaction is more difficult to measure." " They suggest that
inhabitants of local government score their officials on various indices
related to health, education, the environment, etc. There is little
reason to believe, however, that mere public opinion surveys are an
effective way to discern what citizens really want. As Professor Ilya
Somin notes, even with all of the safeguards of liberal democracy-an
independent press, competitive political parties, and organized
interest groups-voters are afflicted by political ignorance and
collective action problems that depress turnout and lead to
uninformed voting.7 6 Mere public opinion polls would suffer from
proportionately greater problems of rational voter ignorance and
collective apathy, because essential devices for organizing and
informing voters (for instance, independent newspapers and interest
groups) do not exist in China.
Land prices informed by citizens' foot-voting, by contrast,
provide an indication of citizens' preferences that is not only simple
and relatively accurate but also ideologically safe. Homebuyers make
individualized rather than collective judgments about the value of
real estate: Households do not ordinarily hold a public meeting in
order to put a bid on a house. The individualistic character of their
home-purchasing decisions alleviates collective action problems faced
by voters (or citizens being polled) in acquiring information, because
each homebuyer faces large stakes and reaps all of the gains from
their research into the competing merits of local governments.7 8 At
the same time, such individualistic household choices to purchase a
particular asset do not announce to the world any abstract normative
principles that compete with the CCP's own ideology. The private and
self-interested character of their foot-voting, therefore, minimizes the
chance that their judgments could constitute the spark that sets off a
prairie fire of revolution against the CCP. Homebuyers on the move
do not congregate in crowds, wave placards, shout angry slogans, or
burn police cars. From the point of view of civic participation, these
traits are strikes against foot-voting. From the point of view of the
CCP, however, the private and individualistic character of house
shopping is not a bug but a feature: Bids on real estate provide much
of the same information that actual elections would provide without
the risk that a narrow vote on garbage collection or quality of schools

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.at 207.
See SOMIN, supra note 45, at 117-18.
See supra Part I.
SOMIN, supra note 45, at 121-25.
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will suddenly and unexpectedly become
legitimacy of CCP rule.
B.

a referendum

on the

Refinements and Qualifications

The basic idea that land prices should play a central role in
the evaluation of cadres is simple enough-in fact, too simple. Below,
we offer some refinements and qualifications.
1. Henry George to the Rescue: Measuring land prices
rather than real estate prices
First, why focus on land prices rather than the price of real
estate generally? The focus on land adds an administrative headache
to the evaluation process, because it requires the evaluators to
determine the share of real estate's value contributed by lots as
opposed to structures. Nevertheless, land prices have an advantage
over housing prices as an index of cadre performance because, unlike
housing, the supply of land is ordinarily fixed by nature and cannot
be reduced by local government policies.7 9 By contrast, cadres who
wanted to drive up the price of housing could do so by using zoning
regulations to restrict the production of housing or by holding
state-owned land off the housing market. If demand for housing in
those cadres' jurisdiction was price-inelastic, then the price of housing
would be boosted, but foot-voters would be left unsatisfied, prohibited
from migrating to a jurisdiction by an artificial housing shortage. By
focusing on the value of land, one avoids this perverse incentive for
officials to restrict the construction of new housing, as such
restrictions would cause the value of restricted lots to fall, not
increase. 0 One can analogize this argument for basing bureaucratic
promotion on land values to Henry George's argument for basing
taxation on the value of vacant land rather than the value of
structures built on that land. Henry George, the 1 9th century
journalist and economic reformer, argued that, by taxing away 100%
of the value of a vacant lot, government would not diminish the
incentives of the lot's owner to build, because landowner could not

79.

Local governments abutting the coast can sometimes increase the

supply of land by filling in coastal areas.
80.
See Malani, supra note 68, at 1293-94 (explaining that the appropriate

measure of a law's value if that law affects housing supply is a land-based rather
than housing-based pricing metric).
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avoid the tax by removing the land from the taxing jurisdiction. 81 This
same inelasticity of land's supply likewise prevents local officials from
affecting land prices with supply-reducing policies.
2. Comparing Apples to Apples: Measuring change in local
governments' land prices relative to land price change
in the metropolitan area
Not all regions are equal. Weather, natural features like
harbors and rivers, geographic proximity to population centers,
economic activity, and many other features give some regions an
inherent advantage over their rivals that no amount of expertise in
government can eliminate. The mayor of Ma'anshan in the inland
province of Anhui cannot move his city closer to the Pearl River
Delta, no matter how well he allocates and manages his city's money
and rules. Competition for foot-voters between Ma'anshan and the
City of Guangzhou, therefore, is a rigged race: Such a competition
would give no incentive to the inevitable losers to improve their
performance. To the contrary, as Cai and Treisman note, competition
for mobile investors between jurisdictions with such different
inherent endowments could lead to a "polarization effect" in which
foot-voters all favor the better endowed while "[p]oorly endowed
units, knowing they will lose, simply give up.82
To ensure fair comparisons, therefore, cadres ought to be
compared not on the basis of the absolute aggregated value of land in
their jurisdiction but rather on the basis of the change in that land's
value during the relevant period of evaluation. If the mayor of
Ma'anshan managed to increase land values in his jurisdiction by a
higher percentage than the percentage increase achieved by the
mayor of Guangzhou, it would be odd to say that the latter
outperformed the former merely because Guangzhou land prices were
higher than Ma'anshan land prices.

81.
HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSION AND INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF
WEALTH 433-38 (Robert Schalkenback Found. ed., 1935) (1879). The Liberty
Fund's Concise Encyclopedia of Economics provides a description of Henry
George's ideas and influence. Charles L. Hooper, Henry George (1839-1897), in
LIBRARY

OF

ECONOMICS

AND

LIBERTY:

THE

CONCISE

ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF

ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/George.html.
82.
Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Does Competition for Capital

Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy,
95 AM. ECON. REV. 817, 828 (2005).
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Likewise, cadres' success or failure in raising land values
should be assessed by comparing land in their jurisdiction only
against land within the same metropolitan area. Factors beyond any
local government's control-say, global warming and rising sea levels
or central government spending in a particular area-might affect the
value of land. Mayors who outperform their metropolitan areas
should not be punished simply because their region happens to fall
behind rival regions because of these extra-local factors. By
narrowing the range of competing local governments and focusing on
change in value regardless of starting or ending values, the central
evaluators of local officials can8 3 narrow (although not entirely
eliminate) endowment advantages.
3. Avoiding Short-term Bubbles with Medium-term Land
Values and Fiscal Contraints
In using land prices to evaluate cadres, it is important to
avoid creating incentives for cadres to inflate short term land bubbles
in order to win promotions. There are, of course, ways in which local
officials can temporarily increase the price of land without improving
governance. Simply by subsidizing land purchases with low-interest
loans, a local government could pump up a real estate bubble that
would deflate as soon as the subsidies ran out. More generally, the
CCP's practice of rotating local officials through several subnational
jurisdictions for very short (less than five-year) tenures in each
jurisdiction can also reduce local officials' incentives to attend to the
long-term consequences of their decisions.8 4

83.

The evaluation criteria for an official governing Local District (LD)

located in a Metropolitan Area (MA) can be expressed in the following formula.
For each LDn, calculate ratioi as A total land value in LDJA total land value in
MA.. Denote ratios as ratioss, ratiol... ratio!, where n is the number of districts
within the metro area. Standardize these ratios as: ratio! s = [ratio!mean(ratio)/std(ratio, for i = 1, 2 . . . n where mean(ratioi) = (ratioss + ratio?'
+... + ratio!) /n. Std(ratioi)is the standard deviation of ratioi
84.
As indirect evidence of the costs of rapid turnover of officials, consider
evidence that enterprises postpone investment and banks were more reluctant to
loan money to local governments during the turnover period. Yang Haisheng et al.
( A ,f t),
Zhengce Bulianxuxing yu Caizheng iaolu Sunshi-Laizi Difang
Guanyuan Biangengde Jingyan Zheng/u, (
_ S
'
/ $
~iWS~S~iI IA# [Discontinuitionin Policies and Loss of FinancialEfficiencyEmpiricalEvidence from the Change of Local Officials], GUANLI SHIJIE (ATlJth[MGMT. WORLD], Dec. 15, 2015, http://www.mwm.net.en/ d277131452.htm; Luo

Danglun & She Guoman (
Zhai Faxing (,,L#
kiW$f0

-Q& I l A), Difang Guanyuan Biangengyu Difang
[Change of Local Officials and Issuance
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One way to lengthen local officials' time horizon is to tie
cadres' fate to the medium- and long-term value of land in the
jurisdictions that they govern. One possibility is to tie their promotion
to the rolling average of changes in the price of land over several
years. Such evaluations could give cadres incentives to care about the
long-term consequences of their policies by tying cadres' evaluations
not only to changes in the price of land in jurisdictions that they
currently manage but also the price of land in jurisdictions where
they were formerly assigned. The longer the period of time over which
the average land price change is calculated, the more the cadre would
have incentives to adopt policies that would create lasting values
rather than short-term bubbles.
Suppose, for instance, that cadres were evaluated on the basis
of a five-year rolling average of land prices, using land in not only
current, but also former jurisdictions to calculate such averages.
Under such an evaluation procedure, a cadre who had served for
three years as a county party secretary after formerly serving as a
township party secretary for the previous three years would be
evaluated not only on the basis of the three-year performance of land
in his county where he was an incumbent but, also on the basis of the
performance of land prices for the previous two years in his former
township-two years after he left township office. Faced with the
prospect of being evaluated by changes in land prices in jurisdictions
following the end of their tenure there, outgoing local officials would
have incentives to install supporters in key positions so their
value-enhancing reforms could continue past the end of their term.85
To further avoid short-term bubbles, the central government
should incorporate local debt burdens into local government leaders'
evaluations. A local leader can manipulate public investments to
maximize land value during his term, but such manipulation can
compromise a city's long-term growth potential. Considering the

of Local Debt], JINGJI YANJIU (LEJ' 5t) [ECON. RES. J.], Oct. 13, 2015,
http://www.cesgw.cn/cn/Newslnfo.aspx?m=20100914093049340648&n=201510131
42944963970. Homebuyers seem to share the same concern about short-tenured
mayors as investors and banks. Thousands of citizens of Datong City, Shanxi
Province, stopped Yanbo Geng, the Chinese mayor featured in a BBC
documentary, on his way out of the city for a better position because they were
concerned that Geng's urban redevelopment projects and policies would not be
continued by his successor. THE CHINESE MAYOR (Zhaoqi Films 2015).

85.
Leaders at the county/urban district level or below have the power to
recommend and evaluate their potential successors according to Article 25 of the
2009 Work Regulations on Promotion of Party and Government Leaders.
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importance of local government finance and the time bomb of huge
local government debt in China, additional safeguards are in order
where local governments' debt is concerned. In theory, bondbuyers
and homeowners might together punish local officials who incur
excessive debt by bidding lower amounts for land and bonds. In
practice, however, the likelihood that the central government will bail
out local governments before they go bankrupt encourages local
officials to incur, and lenders to finance, excessive debt based on the
national government's credit.8 6
4. Protecting Workers: Qualifying land values with
rent-income ratio ("RIR")
The CCP has goals aside from encouraging value-maximizing
governance. They are, after all, communists with presumptively
egalitarian priorities. They are also practically wary of the negative
effect of unaffordable housing on economic and social development.
Such awareness and concern are an important motivation for the
central government issuing orders to local governments to cool down
the housing market in the past two decades. As written in a State
Council ordinance, "housing matters to national economy and people's
livelihood; it is an economic issue, but more importantly an issue of
people's livelihood that impacts social stability.8 s7 Local governments
are also concerned that unaffordable housing might crowd out talent.
As Yu Zhensheng, former party secretary of Shanghai and now
Chairman of the National Political Consultative Conference Standing
Committee said, "Shanghai would lose its advantage in human

86.
See generally JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON'S PARADOX: THE
PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM (2005) (discussing the tendency of
subnational governments to impose exernal costs on the budgetary commons by
borrowing on the de facto credit of the national government). For the challenges of
imposing a hard budget constraint ex ante on local officials in China, see Jing Jin
& Heng-fu Zou Soft Budget Constraints and Local Government in China, in
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
289 (Jonathan A. Rodden et al. eds., 2003). As Arnott and Stiglitz argued, the idea
that local public goods are capitalized into land rents does not insure that cities
will compete for optimal number of residents, because the Arnott-Stiglitz model's
equilibrium is partial insofar as it does not incorporate any local government
budget balance constraint. See Arnott & Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 491.
87.
Guowuyuan Bangongting (%7
_T), Guowuyuan guanyu Jianjue
Ezhi Bufen Chengshi Fangjia Guokuai Shangzhang de Tongzhi ([%±JK*}
Lt±AI,
U
f AM4) (Apr. 17, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010$qnur- k
FJ

04/17/content 1584927.htm.
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resources if it cannot resolve the housing problem."8 8 Han Zheng,
former mayor and now party secretary of Shanghai, also said that
"Shanghai has no future if it cannot resolve the problems of 'snail
house' and 'home mortgage slave' for new Shanghaiers."89
Thus to ensure that local officials minimize the disruption
and unfairness of rents outstripping wages, the central evaluators
ought to consider the ratio of rent to income in making promotion
decisions. Local officials who preside over rising ratios in which
residents pay an ever-higher percentage of their income for rent
should not be rewarded regardless of how much their jurisdiction's
land prices appreciate relative to those in their metropolitan area.
Indeed, the CCP already takes into account the "property-income
ratio" in making promotions.9 This qualification on the use of land
values, therefore, simply preserves a bit of the status quo.
One might protest that there is an inherent contradiction in
rewarding mayors for increasing land prices but punishing them for
escalating rents and falling wages. After all, an influx of homebuyers
to a jurisdiction will, ceteris paribus,predictably cause rents to rise
and wages to fall.91 Why does a steady rent-income ratio criterion not
simply cancel out appreciating land values? The reason is that
matters are not ceterisparibus.The enterprising local official should
fight rising rents with more housing. As more foot-voters pour into a
popular jurisdiction, local officials can increase the supply of housing
by increasing the density and quantity of residentially zoned land. If
supply of housing matches the demand, then rents should stay steady
even as prices of a unit of land appreciate, because more people will
live on the same amount of land. Local officials can, in short,
simultaneously attract new homebuyers and expand the housing
supply to make room for them. 92
88.

Liu Xuezhong (Alt),
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Id.

90.
See Chen Qinggui ( 3 +}h)),Kaoji "Fang/iaShouru Bi"Xu Bawo Sange
Guanian (
tC Ikf"j
<E/&f
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[Three Keys for Incorporating
Price-Income Ratio in Evaluation], CHINA NEWS, Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.china
news.com/estate/2011/01-24/2806953.shtml; Jinri Jujiao:Fang/iaShouru Bi Naru
Guanyuan Kaohe Kaopu ma?('4flR< :
'i//TA/-i A
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V% 5;f N .W[Today's
Focus: Is It Plausible to Incorporate Price-Income Ratio in Cadre Evaluation.l,
SINA, Aug. 1, 2016, http://dichan.sina.com.cn/sh/zt/136guanyuan/.
91.
See Malani, supra note 68, at 1280-90.
92.
Chongqing looks to be a city with a rapidly growing economy and stable
housing prices. According to newpaper reports, the Chongqing government has
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There are admittedly limits on the degree to which the
technology of housing density can match rising demand. Higher
densities can erode demand for land because density sometimes has
costs-especially where the supply of land is tight, such as crowded
sidewalks, shadows from tall buildings, and the like. These features
of density make land less attractive and force local officials to choose
between raising housing supply but reducing demand (i.e., making
their jurisdictions marginally less attractive to foot-voters) or
protecting land values but displacing wage-earners who cannot keep
up with the rising rents.
This dilemma, however, might be more theoretical than real.
Chinese local governments tend to control large territories with
plentiful non-residential land. 93 There would not likely be many
circumstances in which the only way extra foot-voters could be
housed would be to build skyscrapers next to scenic views or demolish
historic districts. Even when such a conflict between increased supply
of and demand for housing arose, however, the dilemma could be
solved simply by evaluating officials on a weighted average for each
value. Under such a dual-factor system, each local government would
be rated not only on the basis of the change in land prices within
their local government relative to land prices in their metropolitan
area but also on their local government's change in the rent-income
ratio relative to changes in the metropolitan rent-income ratio.
Officials who scored well on attracting foot-voters but poorly on
increasing housing supply would lose out in such a tournament to
officials who took a more balanced approach to development. 4

managed to control housing prices by increasing land supply and building social
housing. See Christian Shepherd, How One City in China is Trying to Avoid a
Property Boom and Bust, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.ft.com/
content/2d117204-9758-11e6-aldc-bdf38d484582.
93.
See Kam Wing Chan, Urbanizationand Urban InfrastructureServices
in the PRC, FINANCING LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA, 83-125 (Christine P.W. Wong ed., 1997) (discussing the large amounts of
rural land within prefectural-level and county-level cities).
94.
Again, the criteria can be expressed by a formula similar to the ratio set
forth supra at note 83. This second ratio2 compares the RIR in Local District (LDn)
to the RIR in that LD's metropolitan area (MA). Calculate a standardized ratio2,
A RIR in LDdA RIR in MA, and denote them as ratio2' s, ratio22 s... ratio2 ns. The
weighted average this standardized ratio with the ratio of LD to MA land prices
set forth in supra note 63 is a* ratiol's+b* ratio2' s, where a+b=l.
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FOOT-VOTING WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: THREE

FEASIBLE INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CITIZEN MOBILITY

The defense of foot-voting and land values offered above
ignores the specifics of local governments' design. However, those
details matter. The size, number, and powers of local governments
dramatically affect the capacity of citizens to vote with their feet. For
foot-voting citizens to make meaningful choices among competing
jurisdictions, there must be a sufficient number of jurisdictions
among which to choose. The citizens' choices should also not be
muddied by radical differences among the competing jurisdictions'
private goods like higher wages and job opportunities. Moreover,
citizens' migration must trigger not only the right to receive local
services but also the obligation to pay for them; otherwise, such
migration does not reveal that the citizens value governmental
services at the cost of supplying them. Local officials must have the
power to respond to migrants' demands by extending services to
newcomers and charging those newcomers for the services' costs. In
this section we address and provide practical remedies for three
institutional obstacles to foot-voting: limited fiscal instruments,
improper size of local governments, and the hukou system.
A.

The Problem of Limited Fiscal Instruments

A citizen's decision to migrate to a local government's
territory reveals that the migrant values the benefits of that local
government's services more than those services' costs only if that
citizen must pay those costs (primarily taxes) in order to receive those
benefits. The decision to migrate to a jurisdiction, therefore, should
trigger not only the right to receive services a local government offers
but also the obligation to pay for them. Chinese local governments,
however, cannot easily maintain such a link between the right to
receive and the obligation to pay for public services, because Chinese
law severely limits local governments' fiscal instruments. The result
of such fiscal inflexibility is not only that local governments
frequently gain no additional revenue from new migrants but also
that local officials cannot improve land values by supplying services
at lower costs than neighboring jurisdictions. Both limits prevent
good governmental policies from being reflected in land prices.
The obvious solution is to broaden the range of local
governments' taxing powers-and, in particular, to give local
governments the power to impose property taxes. Proposals to vest
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local governments with property-taxing powers have been broached
before, but such power has not been popular with the CCP because of
its potential to trigger urban unrest among aggrieved property
owners. We argue below, however, that such a tax is politically
feasible if it is tied up with more autonomy over tax revenues and
more influence by taxed interests over the expenditure of those
revenues to enhance local property values.
1. How Lack of Taxing Power Impedes Foot-Voting
Most local taxes in China are skewed towards business-driven
revenue, such as value-added taxes, corporate income taxes, and
business taxes, while taxes on housing ownership have not been
substantial." 5 Local officials' lack of taxing power results in their
interests running counter to citizens' foot-voting: Local officials have
an incentive to exclude new migrants whom they cannot tax even if
the economy of a jurisdiction would benefit from more people. Despite
evidence that the population of Chinese cities is currently too small
for labor to realize its highest value,96 leaders of Chinese cities often
complain about new migrants, egged on by angry residents fearful
that newcomers will crowd schools and roads. 1 Such complaints
make sense to the extent that local governments are unable to

95.
Local governments also derive revenue from property-related taxes
including the urban maintenance and construction tax, urban and township land
use tax, farmland occupation tax, and land appreciation tax. These taxes are
mainly paid by real estate developers and comprise about 10 to 15 percent of local
tax revenue while direct land sales revenue ranges between half of to higher than
total tax revenue in many Chinese cities. See, e.g., Tudi Caizheng Yujing: Difang
Zhengfu Mai Di Quansheng Shiqi Yjing Jieshu (JL yif,
:
91,V Et]YD [Land FinanceAlarm: The Best Time for Selling Land Has Passe],
SINA (May 23, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.en/china/20150523/110322250
448.shtml (stating that a land transaction fee has been a main source of
government revenue).
96.
See Chun-Chung Au & J. Vernon Henderson, Are Chinese Cities Too
Small, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 549 (2006).
97.
See, e.g., Hui Ge @r- ),Chengshi PaiwaiQingxu Buke Zhuzhang(f
zWP f
U
) [Don't PromoteXenophobia in Cities], NANFANG WANG (V)J)
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://view.qq.com/a/20121218/000001.htm (refuting xenophobic
arguments such as that a migrant population takes away educational and

economic resources from locals); Fei Hujisheng Zhengqu Yi& Gaokao Bei Chi
Huangchong Gunchu Shanghai (
>#
$
$
NANFANG WANG (VFAJ)
(Dec. 3, 2012), http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2012-12-

03/1115364244.shtml (reporting that a student who has no hukou in Shanghai but
petitioned to take the college entrance exam there was called a "locust" and was
demanded to get out of Shanghai).
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recover the costs of providing services to new migrants because they
are legally
disempowered from imposing taxes on residential
98
property.
In theory, local governments' ground leases of state-owned
land to private lessees, which last up to 70 years depending on the
land use, might mitigate or even eliminate these perverse fiscal
incentives. As a concession to local governments, the central
government gave its share in land sales revenue to local governments
in the 1998 revision to the Land Administration Law.99 Since then,
with the growth of the Chinese real estate market, land sales revenue
has become an important source of revenue for local governments,
growing from 28.39% to 71.68% in local budgets from 2002 to 2010,
and making up 34.9% of the revenues of prefectural-level cities in
2010.100
Such ground leases offer important advantages over local
governments' other sources of revenue because they give local officials
the flexibility and incentives to tailor revenue, regulations, and
expenditures to foot-voting lessees. Because lessees might be expected
to pay more for land that is well-governed, 0 1 ground leases give local
officials a fiscal incentive to maximize the value of land in their
regulatory decisions. The long terms of ground leases, however, make
them an extraordinarily inelastic device by which to recover the
revenue needed to run a local government. The leases give the local
government no capacity to recover additional revenue from lessees
during the life of the lease based on the local government's success in
attracting new migrants and thereby enhancing the value of leased
land. A new mayor whose city's land has already been leased out
cannot recover revenue from the lessees to improve the city with new
post-lease amenities, even if those amenities are precisely what
foot-voters are currently seeking. In calculating the lessee's payment
at the outset of the lease, therefore, local officials will somehow need
to predict their government's financial needs and the likely benefits of

98.
See infra note 103.
99.
Shitong Qiao, The Politics of Chinese Land: PartialReform, Vested
Interests, and Small Property,29 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 70, 85-86 (2016).
100.

See

MANAGEMENT

ASIAN
IN THE

DEVELOPMENT
BANK,
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

LOCAL
CHINA:

PUBLIC
FINANCE
CHALLENGES AND

OPPORTUNITIES 23 (2014).

101.
See Montinola et al., supra note 63, at 58 ("Jurisdictions are thus
induced to provide a hospitable environment for factors, typically through the
provision of local, public goods .... Those jurisdictions that fail to provide these
goods find that factors move to other jurisdictions.").
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the local government's expenditures over the several decades of the
life of a lease-a challenge in prophecy that might intimidate even
the most prescient gamblers. The uproar occasioned by the City of
Wenzhou's charging lessees substantial sums to renew their land
leases demonstrates the risk of disconnecting government's land
10 2
revenue from private property value.
Local Chinese governments also do not control the rate and
base of the fiscal instruments from which they derive their revenue.
Because the rate and base even for "local" taxes are defined by
national law, subnational governments cannot compete with each
other by offering a reduced tax burden to prospective homebuyers. °3
2. How to Make a Local Property Tax Politically Feasible
There is an economically obvious, normatively appealing, but
politically challenging solution to local governments' limited fiscal
instruments: The National People's Congress could enact a law
conferring on local governments the power to levy a tax on real
property. 104 Although this solution is politically challenging, we argue
below that it is also politically feasible.
The property tax solution is economically obvious: A property
tax would give local officials a revenue incentive to put out the
welcome mat for newcomers, because growth would pay its own way.
In effect, a property tax, coupled with local governments' already
broad power to regulate land use, behaves as a user fee, in which new
102.
See, e.g., Ren Wei, China's Grey-Area For Property Buyers:
Homeowners Face Doubts Over Renewing Land-Use Leases, S.CHINA MORNING
POST (Apr. 19, 2016, 12:10 AM), http://www.semp.com/news/China/economy/
article/1936991/chinas -grey-area-property-buyers -homeowners -face-doubts -over
(discussing public concern over land-use rights in Wenzhou and the call for a clear

legal framework); Stuart Leavenworth & Kiki Zhao, In China, Homeowners Find
Themselves in a Land of Doubt, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016), http://www.ny

times.com/2016/06/01/business/international/in-china-homeowners-find-them
selves-in-a-land-of-doubt.html? r=0 (discussing the uncertainty and unease with

potential government fees connected with the sales of land or renewal of leases);

Lucy Hornby, China Lease Expiries Prompt PropertyRights Angst, FIN. TIMES
(May 2, 2016), https://next.ft.com/contentl952be9a4-Oabe-11e6-bOf1-61f222853ff3
(discussing the plan to charge property owners fees in order to renew residential

leases).

103.
According to Article 8 of the Legislation Law, such a property tax can
be legislated only by the NPC or NPC Standing Committee. See ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO LIFA FA (A4XJ
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA].

104.

See id.

'tU
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migrants receive the benefit of local public goods only if they pay
their share of those goods' average cost. 10 5 So long as the goods are
not congested by additional users, old-timer residents should welcome
the revenue that the newcomers bring.
The property tax solution is also normatively attractive
because it would mobilize homeowners into monitoring local affairs to
ensure their money is properly spent. By making more visible the cost
of governmental services, property taxes would force local cadres to
justify those costs.10 6 By making public expenditure more visible, the
property tax can give property owners incentives to review local
governments' spending. The "sunshine budget" reform experiment in
Wenling City of Zhejiang Province testifies to the power of visibility:
This experiment granted members of people's congresses at the
township level access to budget review and revision, resulting in
fierce debate and veto of the government's budget plan.10 7 Moreover,
local leaders seeking to raise property taxes for new projects will have
an incentive to assuage local homeowners with opportunities to
review budgets and comment on expenditures.0 8 Once the property
tax becomes the main source of local governments' revenue, the
English history as described in Douglas North and Barry Weingast's
"constitution and commitment" can be repeated in China."19
105.
See Bruce W. Hamilton, A Review: Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax?,
in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER TWENTYFIVE YEARS 85, 103-04 (George R. Zodrow ed., 1983); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning
and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URBAN STUD. 205
(1975) (arguing property tax is an efficient tax for public service); see also William
A. Fischel, Homevoters,MunicipalCorporate Governance, and the Benefit View of
the Property Tax, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 157, 157 (2001) (arguing local property taxes
are benefit taxes).
106.
See JOSEPH FEWSMITH, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL REFORM
IN CHINA 34-38 (2012) (noting that experiments in local elections were driven, in
part, by the need to raise revenue through the direct route of taxes rather than
through the indirect financing through the governmental marketing of peasants'
grain). "In this way," Fewsmith notes, "the costs of village government, previously
hidden, became very visible, and peasants resisted paying the taxes to cadres."
107.
Chen Zhouxi (,M ),Wenling Jiceng Minzhu Shiyan Shengi (7 A
0), JINGJI GUANCHA BAO (L%7W
TL
(Mar. 14, 2008),
http://www.eeo.com.en/eeo/jgcb/2008/03/17/94144.shtml.
108.
In the past decade, public participation has been adopted in many
Chinese local governments regarding public utilities (water, gas, etc.) and urban
planning. Analogous interests in winning public buy-in can drive local
governments to promote public participation on revenues and expenditures
derived from taxation.
109.
See Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in
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For all of its economic and normative appeal, however, the
property tax solution is politically tricky, because property taxes have
historically inspired popular resentment and even mass incidents.
The agricultural tax was abolished in 2007 in large part because of
farmers' resistance. 110 Recent narrow experiments with property
taxes in Chongqing and Shanghai have yielded insubstantial revenue
and exempted most property. "' Circumstantial evidence suggests
that the CCP leadership has been concerned with the political risk
while agreeing on the desirability of property tax.1 1 2 The Chinese
Minister of Finance said recently "property tax reform is a
conundrum... but has to be done discarding hesitation."1 3
Nevertheless, we believe that broad authorization for
property taxes is now politically feasible, because property tax
burdens are a more predictable and more elastic source of revenue
than ground lease rents. As ground leases expire in cities across
China, whether and how such leases can be renewed will become
increasingly important. As the controversy surrounding Wenzhou's
charging of stiff fees to renew such leases indicates, homeowners
dislike the unpredictability of these rents.1 1 4 As noted above, such
ground leases are an inelastic instrument for raising revenue; the
local government is forced to cover a multi-decade period of
expenditures with a single, large lump-sum amount of rent. Why not,

Seventeenth-Century England,49 J. ECON. HISTORY 803, 803 (1989) (describing
how structural developments in governmental wealth post-Glorious Revolution
allowed the English to focus on the maintenance of property rights).
110.
See John James Kennedy, From the Tax-For-Fee Reform to the
Abolition of Agricultural Taxes: The Impact on Township Governments in NorthWest China, 189 CHINA Q. 43, 43 (2007); Shitong Qiao, Governing the PostSocialist Transitional Commons: A Case from Rural China, 24 COLO. J. INT'L
ENvTL L. & POL'Y, 117, 130 (2013) (describing rural discontent amongst farmers in
Chinese society post-socialist economic structure); see also Lu Xiaobo, The Politics
of PeasantBurden Reform in China, 25 J. PEASANT STUD. 113, 117-21 (1997)
(providing details about agricultural tax burden and rural resistance in China).
111.
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 100 (describing the
importance of land sales to Chinese government revenue).
112.
See Lou Jiwei: Yiwufangu Tijin Fangdichan Shuizhi Gaige (&/f
) [Lou Jiwei Pushing Forward Real Estate Tax
Reform Without Hesitation], XINHUA WANG (
4 K] ) (July 24, 2016),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-07/24/c 129172837.htm.
113.
See id.
114.
See Stuart Leavenworth & Kiki Zhao, In China, Homeowners Find
Themselves in a Land of Doubt, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016), http://www.ny
times .com/2016/06/01/business/international/in-china-homeowners-find-them
selves-in-a-land-of-doubt.html? r=0.
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then, trade the right to charge high fees for ground lease renewal for
the right to impose property taxes? From the lessee's point of view,
the trade would allow them to amortize their rent over many years by
making quarterly or annual property tax payments rather than a
single up-front rent payment. Moreover, precisely because they are
levied for shorter intervals of time, lessees have more opportunities to
contest the amount of taxes, demanding equivalent returns in
services. To sweeten the pot for homeowners, the National People's
Congress could make a local government's authority to impose
property taxes contingent on the assurance that no further fees or
rents, beyond the property tax, would be imposed on lessees as a
condition for renewing a ground lease, eliminating the uncertainty of
title from which ground lessees suffer in a system of multi-decade
renewals. Moreover property-related taxes now paid by real estate
developers actually constitute fifty to sixty percent of property prices
and are thus paid indirectly by property buyers.115 Replacing these
fragmented property-related taxes with a uniform property tax
therefore would not increase the burden of property buyers but
instead make their contribution to the government finance more
visible, giving them more leverage in urban governance. 116
In short, ground leases' gradual expiration across dozens of
Chinese cities provides a golden, once-in-a-generation opportunity for
the National People's Congress to replace an inelastic, politically
contentious, and unpredictable source of revenue with a system of
property taxation. It would allow local officials to compete with each
other on their ability to cut tax burdens as well as provide services.
B.

The Problem of Excessive Size

Related to the problem of local governments' limited fiscal
instruments is the problem of local governments' excessive size. A
relatively tiny number of local governments have final and pervasive
power over immense amounts of land, making it difficult for any
homebuyer to practically shop among competing providers of local
public goods. Such territorially immense local governments effectively
operate as local monopolies, extracting locational rents from
homebuyers who, because of employment and family ties, cannot exit
115.

See Chen Shaoying (3+P), Lun Woguo Wuyeshui de Lifa Mubiao
lht)
tEJWJ
[On Legislative Objectives of Real Estate Tax in Our

Country, 74 EASTERN CHINA UNIV. POL. Sm. & L.J. (2011), http://article.china
lawinfo.com:81/article print.asp?articleid=61964.
116.
See id.
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an entire metropolitan area in order to seek a better deal from
another local government. As with the limits on fiscal instruments,
however, there is a politically palatable fix well within the pale of
Chinese political traditions-the fix of a federated city.
1. Chinese Cities as Leviathans:
The Costs of Unified Metro Government
A brief overview of local governments in a single province
illustrates the vastness of the territory governed by Chinese cities.
The province of Guangdong, for instance, contains 108 million
residents 117 but only twenty-one sub-provincial cities. 118 Its capital
city, Guangzhou, has eleven urban districts each of which governs
over one million in population on average but are simply subsidiaries
of the city government lacking independent zoning power. 19 By
contrast, New York State, with a population roughly one and a half
times the size of Guangzhou City,1 2° contains within its borders 932
towns, 551 villages, and 62 cities. 12 There are forty-eight towns,
cities, and villages in Westchester County alone, all of which are
within a practical commuting distance of New York City.1 22 Each of
these local governments can make independent
decisions about
1 23
zoning, expenditures, and taxation levels.

117.
See Guangdong Sheng 2015 Aian Quanguo 11, Renkou Chouyang
Diaocha Zhuyao Shuju Gongbao (
2015 J±
1CcA J
i
) [GuangdongProvince NationalPopulation 1 ' Sampling Survey Statistics],
GUANGDONG BUREAU OF STAT. (MAY 11, 2016), http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/
tjzl/tjgb/201605/t20160511 327841.html.
118.
Gaikuang (4'ti5) [General Information], PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF
GUANGDONG PROVINCE (Jan. 21, 2016, 10:05 AM), http://www.gd.gov.cn/
gdgk/sqgm/201501/t201501212 08192.htm.
119.
2015 Nian Guangzhou Shi Renkou Guimo ji Fenbu Qingkuang
(2015 >
[ r.
r
F1
?ZaFIh), GUANGZHOU SHI TONGJI JU RENKOU CHU
rl- Ajtq A E)
(Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.gzstats.gov.cn/tjyw/201604/t2016
0412 39495.htm.
120.
See
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
Quick
Facts: New
York,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/36 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017)
(providing data on the population of New York state).
121.
N.Y. DEP'T OF STATE, DIV. OF LOCAL GOV T SERV., What Do Local
Governments Do http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/localgovs.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2017).
122.
Evan Bindelglass, This Graph Pits the Suburbs Against NYC,
Commute Times, CURBED N.Y. (Dec. 5, 2015, 10:15 AM), http://ny.curbed.com/
2015/12/5/9894192/this -graph-pits -the-suburbs -against-nyc -via-commute -times.
123.
N.Y. DEP'T OF STATE, DIV. OF LOCAL GOV'T SERV., supra note 121.
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Each of these large Chinese cities controls the entire economy
of a metropolitan area where many mutually dependent businesses
congregate to take advantage of "agglomeration economies"-that is,
the benefits of locating near similar businesses. 124 Such businesses
and their employees cannot freely shop among metropolitan areas for
the best providers of public services, because some areas have built-in
advantages-inherent
"endowments" in Cai and Treisman's
phrase-that defeat rival jurisdictions' efforts to attract investment
through superior governance. 12 5 If local officials were promoted based
on their success in increasing the price of housing, then local officials
controlling such immense quantities of real estate would have
incentives to behave like Brennan and Buchanan's "leviathans"
rather than like competitive businesses: They would extract
locational rents from captive land buyers by reducing housing
supply.126 The price of housing might increase in such a jurisdiction,
but such an increase would reflect deadweight costs of frustrated
demand rather than social benefits, as workers would be deterred by
governmental policy from migrating to the areas where their labor is
most productive. The demand for land within such immense
jurisdictions is predictably price-inelastic because, for many
households, there are few adequate substitutes for land in the
metropolitan area. Economists have long argued that the inelasticity
of supply of local governments insures that pure citizen mobility can
never fully replace citizen voice. 127 The large physical size and
arguable under-population of Chinese cities suggests that this
theoretical objection to foot-voting has practical application in China.

124.

For an overview of the idea of "agglomeration economies," see

MASAHISA FUJITA, ET AL., THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1999); EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION

(2008).
See Cai & Treisman, supra note 82, at 828 (noting that "poorly

AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 116

125.

endowed units, knowing that they will lose [in the competition for investment],
simply give up").

126.
On the idea that non-competitive governments engage in predatory
behavior, see generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER
TO

TAX:

ANALYTICAL

FOUNDATIONS

OF

A FISCAL

CONSTITUTION

(2006);

Qiao, supra note 99 (describing how Chinese cities use their control over the
conversion of rural land to urban use as a device to reduce the supply of land and
thereby maintain higher land prices).

127.

For an economic model showing that politics must supplement

mobility where the supply of local governments is inelastic, see Dennis Epple &
Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition Among Jurisictions: Does
Tiebout Need Politics 89 J. OF POL. ECON. 1197, 1216 (1981).
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The obvious solution to the problem of excessive size is to
delegate land-use planning powers to smaller scale units of local
12
government that can be clustered into a single metropolitan area. 8
Assuming a transportation network that permits employees of
business in the area to live within any of these local governments and
commute to work, no household in such a governmentally-fragmented
urban area would ever be forced to choose between the benefit of
higher wages and the benefit of better public services. The result
would be that households tied by employment or family to a
particular commutershed could nevertheless shop among dozens of
competing providers of local public goods. As discussed above, a
couple who work in New York City can choose where to live among
forty-eight towns, cities, and villages in Westchester County alone.
None of these tiny governments control enough land to increase
housing prices by restricting supply.
Extreme decentralization of zoning and taxing authority,
however, is hardly a panacea. Because tiny local governments cannot
capture the benefits of regulatory programs that extend throughout a
commutershed, local officials in charge of those governments tend to
neglect those programs. Again, Westchester County provides an
illustrative case. The individual towns and villages within
Westchester County zone their residential land primarily for
single-family detached houses, excluding multi-family housing
affordable for working class families. 129 Although local governments
may have several motives for such exclusion of affordable housing,
one is fiscal: Property taxes levied on multi-family housing often do
not cover the costs of educating the children residing in such

128.
See ira note 143 and accompanying text for information about pilot
programs.
129.
See Sam Roberts, Westchester Adds Housing to Desegregation Pact,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/nyregion/
11settle.html (describing exclusionary zoning practices, such as setting minimum
lot sizes, discouraging higher-density developments, and using vacant property for
non-housing purposes that resulted in a federal lawsuit and ultimately a consent

decree through which the county committed to challenge these village and town
zoning practices and build 750 units of affordable housing over seven years); Mark
Lungariello, Westchester Still SegregatedDespite Lawsuit, Group Says, LOHUD
(May 13, 2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/westchester/
2016/05/13/ade-affordable-housing/84285490/ (reporting that many communities

in Westchester County continue to have exclusionary zoning laws that amount to
a failure to comply with the requirements of the consent decree).
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housing. 130 Affordable housing is beneficial to industrial and
commercial employers who need to attract employees with affordable
rents, and commercial and industrial uses often generate tax revenue
in excess of the costs of services. The local governments that do not
host the industrial or commercial uses, however, have no power to tax
those uses to cover the costs of educating the employees' children. 3
In effect, local governments in Westchester County face a collective
action problem. Each government wants to host and tax
non-residential uses that depend on affordable housing that they
132
would prefer to be hosted by other jurisdictions.
In choosing local governments with the right physical size,
therefore, Chinese law-makers face a dilemma. 133 If the local
governments are too physically large, they will create a "leviathan
effect" by extracting locational rents rather than competing for new
residents, but, if they are too small, they will not capture the benefits
of the uses that they regulate.1 3 4 Extremely large territories relative
to population, soaring urban property prices, and under-populated

130.
See, e.g., Katia Brener, Note, Belle Terre and Single-Family Home
Ordinances: JudicialPerceptions of Local Government and the Presumption of
Validity, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 447, 464 (1999) (describing local governments as
motivated to pass exclusionary zoning laws to protect home and family).
131.
Id.
132.
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Saving Mount Laurel?, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1611, 1617-19 (2013).
133.
Following Mancur Olson, supra note 38, this dilemma can be
characterized as the "dilemma of fiscal equivalence," with fiscal equivalence
standing for a matching of the obligation to raise revenue with the right to spend
such revenue. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 207, 208-09 (Daniel
Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (describing Mancur Olson's "dilemma
of fiscal equivalence").
134.
For literature suggesting the ambiguous effects of fragmenting
metropolitan areas among many local governments, see George W. Hammond &
Mehmet S. Tosun, The Impact of Local Decentralization on Economic Growth:
Evidence from US. Counties, 51 J. REGIONAL Sm. 47, 48 (2011) (finding that
fragmentation
increases
economic
growth
in
metropolitan
but
not
non-metropolitan counties); Arthur C. Nelson & Kathryn A. Foster, Metropolitan
Governance Structure and Income Growth, 21 J. URB. AFF. 309, 319 (1999)
(finding that the presence of a metropolitan government improved income growth
in fragmented urban areas), Dan Stansel, Local Decentralization and Local
Economic Growth:A Cross-SectionalExamination of US MetropolitanAreas, 57 J.
URB. AFF. 47, 62-65 (2004) (finding negative relationship between the central-city
share of metro area population and economic growth and a positive relationship
between both the number of municipalities per 100,000 residents and the number
of counties per 100,000 residents and economic growth).
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Chinese cities all suggest that, in China, the "leviathan" effect
predominates. 135 The question remains whether the Chinese system
of local government can be reformed in a politically feasible way to
successfully balance these rival risks.
2. The Solution of the Federated City
We suggest that China's current multi-layered system of local
government provides the CCP leadership with ample opportunities to
experiment with what we call "the federated city," a metropolitan
organization that can simultaneously avoid the leviathan effect and
still capture regional economies in the production of laws and
infrastructure. Our basic proposal is that sub-city governments ought
to be given more functionally specialized taxing, spending, and
regulatory powers that are tailored to their geographic scope. Urban
districts embedded in cities, for instance, ought to have the power to
tax land in their territory to finance the infrastructure and regulation
that primarily benefits district land. The larger city, in turn, ought to
have primary responsibility for infrastructure that benefits the entire
region. On this division of responsibilities, Pudong District, a
subdivision of Shanghai, would be responsible for imposing taxes on
its own real estate to finance Century Park, the 140-hectare park
located in Pudong's new area, because it is likely that the park will
only increase the value of land located in Pudong itself. By contrast,
the Shanghai government would be responsible for financing Pudong
International Airport, because the entire region is served by such
large-scale transit infrastructure.
Is such a suggested reform of metropolitan government
politically feasible in China? Debates about the proper scale of local
government in China are hardly novelties, dating back to at least the
Qing Dynasty, when the emperor rejected the creation of townships
for fear that they would add to residents' tax burden. 136 More recently
(between 1983 and 1997), China has experimented with allowing
counties to apply to become "county-level cities" ("CLCs") with greater
1 37
access to revenue and regulatory powers than ordinary counties.
135.
On the under-population of China's cities, see Au & Henderson, supra
note 96, at 571-72.
136.
See WILLIAM T. ROWE, CHINA'S LAST EMPIRE: THE GREAT QING 50
(2009) (describing emperor's rejection of proposals in the 1720s to create
township-level government below the traditional county magistracies).
137.
See Shenggen Fan et al., Challenges of Creating Cities in China:
Lessons From a Short-Lived County-to-City UpgradingPolicy,40 J. COMP. ECON.
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The central authorities abandoned the creation of new CLCs in 1997,
perhaps motivated by the absence of evidence that CLCs actually
outperformed ordinary counties 138 and also by the additional costs
that such CLCs imposed on the central government. 139 There is,
however, little doubt that the Chinese leadership has the political will0
14
to experiment with delegations of greater powers to smaller units.
The political feasibility of such a reform might increase to the extent
that the newly empowered units are expected to pay their own way
with their own tax revenue.
Would devolution of power to smaller units improve
metropolitan governance? There is circumstantial evidence that
prefectural-level cities' productivity increases if they contain more
than a single urban district, with the benefits peaking at three
districts per city with 1.28 million residents. 141 It is difficult, however,
to assess the relative performance of unified versus fragmented
metropolitan areas in China, because China has not delegated the
sort of broad regulatory
or taxing powers that we recommend to the
142
subdivisions of cities.
In the absence of firmer evidence, pilot programs are needed
in order to test the benefits and costs of fragmentation. Facilitating
foot-voting requires some strengthening of sub-city units to enable
citizens to shop within a single metropolitan area, but Chinese
reformers are already experimenting with such devolution. 143 Such a
476, 478-80 (2012) (describing the process by which counties could enlarge their
powers by becoming county-level cities).

138.

See id., at 489.

139.
See Li Lixing, The Incentive Role of Creating "Cities" in China,
22 CHINA ECON REV. 172, 174-75 (2011).
140.
See infra note 143 and accompanying text for pilot programs.
141.
See Bindong Sun, Tinglin Zhang, Yinyin Cai, & Rui Wang,
Government Fragmentation and Metropolitan Economic Performance: Evidence
from China 9 (UCLA Ziman Center for Real Estate Working Paper, 2014),

http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/Documents/areas/ctr/ziman/2014-06WP.pdf.
142.
See Jae Ho Chung and Tao-chiu Lam, China's "City System "in Flux:
Explaining Post-Mao Administrative Changes, 180 CHINA Q. 945, 958 (2004)

(arguing urban districts do not constitute a level of fiscal authority). The urban
districts are otherwise delegated a wide range of responsibilities including judicial
and civil administration, public health and security, industry and commerce,
education, and cultural issues. See Him Chung, State Regulation and China's
AdministrativeSystem: A SpatialPerspective, 8 CHINA REV. 201, 225 (2008).
143.
In 2015, for instance, the National Development and Reform
Commission promulgated a plan to experiment with township-level cities in
Dongguan to grant more autonomy to township governments in the city. See "Che
Zhen Jian Shi' Dongguan Xian Shi dui Zhongshan Youhe Qishi? "MP, t"+,
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devolution need not result in undersized urban districts imposing
external costs on their neighbors or neglecting externally beneficial
infrastructure, because cities in which these subunits are embedded
could pick up the regional slack. In particular, tax revenue from
large-scale businesses employing commuters from the entire region
could be redistributed to those urban districts that provide housing
and services, such as schools for workers at such enterprises. This
would avoid the collective action problem confronted by small local
governments competing for business but shun the housing needed to
attract workers.
C.

Reforming Hukou to Facilitate Foot-Voting

The power of Chinese citizens to vote with their feet is limited
by China's household registration system (hukou, P FI). Inhabitants
without hukou do not get the benefits of local medical, educational,
and other social services provided by the local government.144 To what
extent are such impediments to free mobility an obstacle to the sort of
foot-voting that we defend?
1. The Obstacle of Hukou to Foot-Voting
There is no doubt that hukou poses a major obstacle to
Chinese citizens' foot-voting. It is a paradox that the more migrants a
city attracts, the more reluctant a city government is to open its social
welfare system to such migrants. Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and
Guangzhou-all Chinese mega cities and economic engines that are
the most popular destinations for migrant populations-are also the
most aggressive in strictly limiting their schools and social security
systems to people with hukou.145 Although the central government
-7 TRY
<7)0T7
p?) [Replacing Townships with Cities First Experimented in
Dongguan: What's the Lesson for Zhongshan.l, PEOPLE (Feb 12, 2015),
http://cpc.people.com.en/n/2015/0212/87228-26551285.html.
144.
See, e.g., Mingqiong Zhang et al, The Institution of Hukou-based
Social Exclusion: A Unique Institution Reshaping the Characteristics of
Contemporary Urban China, 38 INT'L J. OF URB. & REG'L RES. 1437, 1443 (2014)
(finding that rural towns discriminate against migrant workers in denying

benefits associated with hukou).
145.
Quanguo Zuinan Na Hukou de Shige Chengshi: Ruhu Nandu he
Fangiia Cheng Zhengbi&(
yk4 :J1
Wt:A yg
,j"W
t [The
Top Ten Cities Measured by the Difficulty of Receiving Hukou: Positive
Correlation between Housing Prices and Difficulty in Receiving Hukou],
MEIJING WANG (4 V), May 16, 2016, http://www.nbd.com.en/articles/2016-0516/1005283.html.
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has pushed hukou reform across the country, it has accommodated
the largest cities' desire to exclude persons without hukou, adopting
instead the policy of "open [ing] the hukou system in towns and small
cities comprehensively, open[ing]] the hukou system in medium-size
cities orderly, in big cities reasonably,and strictly control[ling] the
population of especially big cities. '146 The State Council has defined
"especially big cities" as cities with more than five million in
population, 147 which would exclude essential reforms in most of the
fast-growing cities. The number of people excluded from local services
by the hukou system is staggering, constituting huge percentages of
the residents in China's "mega-cities. 148
Without an effective mechanism by which cities can charge
migrants with the costs of the services that these migrants consume,
city mayors view the migrant population as a pure burden. 149 Lacking
a direct and simple way to tax residential development, local officials
rely on a complex formula for awarding hukou to migrants likely to
add to a city's economic productivity and not burden city services.
Despite some differences in details, Chinese mega cities have granted
hukou to migrants based on education, wealth, skills, and

146.
Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu Quanian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan
Zhongda Wenti de Juecling ( ,
k
t/J
/ 72PD [The
CCP Central Committee Decision on Several Important Issues of
Comprehensively Deepening Reform], XINHUA WANG ( 4 h), Nov. 12, 2013,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c 118164235.htm.
147.
Guowuyuan (1M
) [State Council], Guanyu Jinyibu Tuijin Huji
Zhidu Gaige de Yijian (
-1
tj,,) [Opinions on Pushing
Hukou Reform Forward] (Jul. 30, 2014), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201407/30/content 8944.htm.
148.
Among the 13.5 million population in Guangzhou, only 8.5 million
have hukou; among the 23 million population in Beijing, only 13 million have
hukou; among the 24 million population in Shanghai, only 14 million have hukou;
among over 12 million population in Shenzhen, only three million have hukou.
See Qunian Guangzhou Huji Renkou wei Jin Sannian lai Zuigao
Q'A-)[Last Year Populationwith hukou in Guangzhou the Highest in
Recent Three years], IFENG (Apr. 14, 2016), http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160414/
48450684 0.shtml.
149.
See, e.g., Chen Renze (
), Teda Chengshi Renkou Nenggou
Kongzhi ma?
J1
A
fA Z ?) [Can We Control Populationin Mega
Cities.], RENMIN WANG (A
FJ]) (Sep. 27, 2013), http://finance.people.com.en/
n/2013/0927/c1004-23051143.html (arguing that the current mechanisms for
dealing with the imbalance of resources resulting from the surge of migrants,
such as prohibiting "group renting" and limiting purchases, are short-sighted and
will create new problems down the way).
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youthfulness.150 The essentially fiscal character of hukou is revealed
by the bonus points awarded to outside investors who create more
than a certain number
of job opportunities and pay above a certain
151
amount of taxes.
Concededly, some sort of link between revenues and
expenditures is necessary not only for economic efficiency, but also for
foot-voting democracy. 152 In order to cast an intelligent "foot-vote" on
both expenditures and revenue generation, citizens' choice of a
jurisdiction as their residence must trigger not only the right to
receive local benefits but also the obligation to pay for those benefits.
Otherwise, migration does not reveal that the citizen values the
benefit at its cost of production. Given the limits on local taxing
powers, the hukou-awarding system in big Chinese cities is actually
quite rational as a way of matching revenues and expenditures. But a
mechanism like Shanghai's that rates migrants by a complex mix of
demographic, economic, and educational factors is a much more crude
mechanism by which to assess migrants' willingness and ability to
pay, resulting in the exclusion of many potential citizens from
receiving services who might be willing and able to pay for them.
Whether a migrant worker would contribute to a city economy
sufficiently to cover the costs of local services that the migrant
receives should be decided on a far simpler basis-whether he or she
has a job, the wages of which suffice to cover the costs of the services
that he or she receives. If there is demand for the migrant's labor
within a jurisdiction that is sufficient to cover both the public and
private costs of the migrant's working in that jurisdiction, then why
should the city government deter the migration by withholding local
services? One need not (and we do not) endorse the view that cities
150.
The four main sections of the Shanghai hukou point-accumulation
system (P6iSt
) are age (the younger the better), education (the more
educated the better), expertise and professional skills (the higher the better), and
length of time paying social security in Shanghai (the longer the better). See 2016
Nian Shanghai Jifen Luohu Zhidu Xize (2016 W9,$fg
4 S Zy'7
[2016
Shanghai Detailed Rules of Point-Accumulation System of Receiving Hukou],
SHANGHAI HUKOU WANG (
p
H]
K ), http://www.hukoushanghai.com/
shhkxzc/550.html.
151.
See id.
152.
For a concise statement of the argument that economic efficiency
requires that local governments generate from their own residents the revenue
that they spend on those residents, see RICHARD MUSGRAVE, Combining and
SeparatingFiscalChoices: Wicksellts Model at its Centennial,in PUBLIC FINANCE
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: VOLUME III THE FOUNDATIONS OF TAXATION AND
EXPENDITURE 81, 99-101 (2000).
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will inevitably reach their optimal population through private
migration decisions as long as migrants pay the average cost of the
public services that they consume. 153 The justification for restricting
city size, however, should be rooted in some specific analysis of a
market failure in private locational decisions, not in local
governments' arbitrarily limited choice of fiscal instruments. The
challenge of hukou reform is to figure out how local governments can
more directly charge migrant workers for the costs of the local public
services that they consume as a result of their decision to migrate.
2. Reforming the Hukou System through Broader Fiscal
Instruments and Federative Local Governments
We urge that hukou within a jurisdiction be based exclusively
on the migrants' purchase or rental of real property in the jurisdiction
providing the service for which hukou is sought. Our proposal for
hukou reform, however, is contingent on the adoption of our two
previous recommendations for the broadening of smaller local
governments' taxing and regulatory powers in the context of a
federated metropolitan area. At its most basic level, we urge that the
migrant's willingness to pay the price of renting or buying land
presumptively indicates that the migration is cost-justified, just so
long as local governments have broad powers to charge new migrants
for the services that they consume and are small enough not to act as
little leviathans, extracting locational rents by restricting housing
supply. Further refinements of migration incentives, as we suggest
below, can be managed by the federated metropolitan areas described
and defended in Part IV(B)(2) above.
Our proposal does not eliminate hukou. Under our proposal,
cities can still withhold services from citizens who neither rent nor
buy real estate within the service-providing jurisdiction. In this
153.
The question of whether and under what conditions free migration
results in optimally populated cities is a complex one. Under reasonable
assumptions, "competition neither leads to, nor sustains, cities of optimal size."

Arnott & Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 498. For an argument that migration leads to
excessively populated cities because migrants pay only average costs rather than
marginal costs of their migration, see George Tolley, The Welfare Economics of
CityBigness, 1 J. URB. AFF. 324, 324 (1974). For an argument that certain cities'
locational advantages and incentive effects of national taxes lead to suboptimally
small cities, see David Albouy & Nathan Seegert, The Optimal Population
Distributionacross Cities and the Private-Social Wedge 1 (Working Paper 2010),
http://homedev.business.utah.edu/u0908787/papers/OptimalPopulationDistributio
nacrossCitiesandthePrivateSocialWedge AlbouySeegert.pdf.
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respect, our proposed form of hukou resembles the concept of "bona
fide residency" in U.S. constitutional law.154 If we treat hukou as a
shorthand for eligibility to enjoy the public services and urban
governance provided by a particular jurisdiction, then, under our
proposal, each city would have its own hukou system in which
residents who own or rent an apartment in a city are "granted
hukou"-that is, made eligible to receive the package of local public
goods provided by the local government. The local government's
power to exclude persons who have not invested in local real estate
distinguishes our proposal from alternative recommendations that
abandon the hukou system completely by delegating to the central
government the task of guaranteeing every citizen equal access to the
same "basic" public services across different local governments. 155 Our
justification for rooting hukou in the purchase or rental of land
requires the adoption of our proposals above which call for
territorially smaller local governments to exercise a broader set of
taxing powers.1 56 If local governments can recapture the value they
confer on land through their services, then the price of that land
should presumptively reflect both the value of the services and the
burden of the taxes needed to finance them.
Would a property-based hukou system exclude middle- and
low-income populations from a city? We think not. Consider the
example of so-called "left-behind children" (Jiushou ertong, ',TLff).
Parents seeking higher wages in a productive city where they lack
hukou must leave their children behind in the village where they
154.

For an explanation of how lack of "bona fide residency" is a sufficient

basis under the U.S. Constitution for local governments to withhold basic
educational and other local services, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty,
Residency, and Federalism:States'Dutyof ImpartialityTowardNewcomers, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 277, 281-83, 288-98, 301-09, 312-26. For an example of the U.S.
Supreme court's upholding a school district's exclusion of a child from its public
schools because the child was not a bona fide resident of the school district, see
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 332-33 (1983).
155.
See Wang Ling ( -n), Huji Zhidu Gaige Tuijin Huanman Xuezhe
Jianyi Gage Jizhi (-_S
-#tMi' A#47S [Reform of the
Household Registration System has Moved Forward Slowly Scholar Suggests
Reform

Mechanisms],

YICAI

(May

27,

2015),

http://news.xinhuanet.com/

fortune/2014-07/31/c 126819302.htm(stating that the central government has the
power to design the system); Kam Wing Chan, The HouseholdRegistrationSystem

and Migrant Labor in China:Notes on a Debate, 36 POPULATION AND DEV. REV.
357, 361 (one stream of reform proposals is concerned with making the hukou

system more "humane," for example, offering urban hukou to migrant workers'
children and parents).
156.
See supra part IV. B.
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have hukou so that their children can attend school.157 Such family
separations can be emotionally painful and logistically difficult.158
Because migrant workers frequently rent housing where they work,
our proposal would entitle them to bring their children with them.
Would local governments be incentivized to limit development
density to ensure that each migrant pays the average per capita cost
of local services? Because property taxes are typically levied on the
value of land and improvements, landowners who squeeze more
people into a less valuable structure pay less in taxes per unit of
service consumed than landowners who develop land at a lower
density with more valuable structures. Therefore local governments
might have incentives to impose a prohibition on high-density
development, a form of "fiscal zoning," thereby transforming the
property tax into a benefits charge under which each resident is
forced to pay a minimum tax price sufficient
to cover her consumption
1 59
of services like education for her children.
We believe that the danger of fiscal zoning is mitigated by the
weakness of urban districts and the supervisory role of
157.
See, e.g., Lizzie Dearden, Four Siblings "Kill Themselves"After Being
Abandoned by Parents in China, THE INDEPENDENT (June 13, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/four-siblings-kill-themselves-afterbeing-abandoned-by-parents-in-china-10317720.html (explaining that the hukou
system prevents migrant workers from bringing their children with them when
they move to a different city for a job, as the children will lose their right to
subsidized education, health care, and other basic services in the new city); John
Sudworth, Counting the Cost of China s Left-Behind Children, BBC (Apr. 12,
2016), http://www.bbe.com/news/world-asia-china-35994481 (estimating that more
than sixty million children in China are living away from their parents as their
parents live and work elsewhere).
158.
Zhang Xudong et al. (GKLHf), Nongeun Liushou Ertong Cunzai de
Jiuge Tuchu Wenti ji Duie Jinyi ($N #
I;/zj Wv
[Nine Prominent Problems of "Left behind" Children and Proposed Solutions],
PEOPLE

(June 19, 2015), http://theory.people.com.en/n/2015/0619/4053127180

206.html (reporting higher rate of pyschological issues in "left behind" children).
159.

For the most famous theory that set forth that the property tax

becomes a benefit charge when combined with restrictive zoning, see Bruce W.
Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12
URB. STUD. 205, 210 (1974). However, the theory has been challenged. See Peter
Mieszkowski & George R. Zodrow, Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The
DifferentialEffects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes, 27
J. ECON. LIT. 1098, 1130-31 (1989) (arguing that only "perfect zoning" that
prevented any sort of value-lowering alterations and structures would transform a
property tax into a benefits charge). William Fischel has responded to this
argument against the "benefit" theory of taxation. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING
RULES!: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION 135-36, 142-44 (2015).
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prefectural-level cities, characteristics that avoid both "leviathan"
effects and externalities. Urban districts are too small to enjoy a
monopoly over an entire metropolitan area's land. They are, however,
also large enough to capture many of the external benefits conferred
by affordable housing on commercial, office, and industrial uses. The
urban district and county, therefore, resemble what Professor
William Fischel calls the "concentrated" metropolitan area. It has
enough local governments to avoid "monopoly pricing" for land yet not
so many that competition leads to free-riding and collective action
problems that lead to the excluson of affordable housing. 160 Even
though current interjurisdictional competition in China focuses on
investment, we have seen evidence that local governments open
public services and provide residential land to increase their
competitiveness. 161 Moreover, we note that the devolution of taxing
and regulatory power to urban districts leaves in place
prefectural-level cities' powers to correct external economies between
districts. In a federative metropolitan area, the prefectural-level city
could be given control over business-oriented taxes imposed on
industrial and commercial uses, redistributing some share of this tax
revenue to districts that provide the housing and educational services
needed by those employers' workers.
CONCLUSION
By promoting local officials on the basis of local land values,
Chinese law could give them an incentive to cultivate allies who
would protect those values on which the officials' careers rested.
These allies would not be motivated by high-minded ideals of
democracy and human rights but selfish and grubby preferences to
safeguard their down payment. Precisely for that reason, the CCP
could tolerate the sorts of participation that these foot-voters-turnedhomevoters would foster. Compared with the exercise of ballot-voting
on more abstract and edifying issues, such local participation on
garbage collection and school performance might seem like small
potatoes. But those are the only potatoes on offer in China in the

160.
William Fischel, Political Structure and Exclusionary Zoning: Are
Small Suburbs the Big Problem?, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND LAND
POLICIES 111, 120-22 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2008).

161.
See Celine Ge, Housing Crisis in China s "Silicon Valley' Huawe4
Other Hi-Tech Giants Head for Cheaper Cities as Rising Costs Deter Talent, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (May 30, 2016), http://www.semp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1952617/housing-crisis -chinas -silicon -valley-huawei-other-hi.
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current regime. We suggest that such improvements, small as they
are, are worth advancing, both for CCP leaders intent on promoting
their own legitimacy and assuaging Weibo anger as well as for
democratic reformers who would like to see a foot-voting mechanism
that could imitate ballot voting.
Interjurisdictional competition has been a familiar theme in
Chinese law and politics. During the Great Leap Forward from 1959
to 1961, over thirty million people died from starvation in part
because provincial leaders competed for Chairman Mao's favor by
delivering ever-higher grain quotas to the central government. 162 On
the other hand, the Chinese economic miracle in the past thirty-six
years is also attributed to subnational leaders' interjurisdictional
competition, this time, to attract investment capital. 163 These two
different stories tell us that the voice to which local officials respond
crucially affects the consequence of interjurisdictional competition.
Our proposal endeavors to transform competitions for the favor of
supreme leaders or capital investors into competitions for the favor of
the Chinese people. This would not be the final step of China's
democratization, but it would nevertheless be a crucial step towards
increasing local government accountability. Once local officials begin
to solicit the "foot-votes" of migrants, they also will have incentives to
promote internal procedures to protect those foot-voters' investments.
Such procedures might logically and eventually include ballots.
The Chinese case also reveals the nuanced relationship
between voice and exit. Just as we say exit is foot-voting, exit is also
voice in the most essential way. Scholars have sometimes assumed
away the political mechanisms by which exit converts into a plausible
complement for voice. 164 Neither foot-voting nor ballot-voting is a
silver bullet against government unaccountability. As we show in the
Chinese context, it requires proper examination of the size of local
governments, the fiscal system, and the immigration system, among
many other aspects of public law. Is democracy possible in China? We
do not know; it depends on your definition of "democracy." But can
government accountability in China be improved through household
mobility? Our answer is yes.
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) [Dilemma of Local Competition], CHINA REFORMS (Sep. 1, 2011),
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See Xu, supra note 66.
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See Part JJ.A on this point.

